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THE CENTRAL MEANING OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
TRACEY MACLIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which guarantees our right to be free from unreasonable govern-
ment searches and seizures,1 presents a quandary for society. For
some it embodies, inter alia, the right of every person "to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable govern-
mental intrusion. ' That conception of the amendment partially
explains the familiar maxim: "a man's home is his castle." S The
Fourth Amendment also "reflects experience with police ex-
cesses."4 It makes plain, perhaps more than any other provision of
the Bill of Rights, that the Constitution does not tolerate the tac-
tics of a police state. Unquestionably, the protections of the Fourth
Amendment are fundamental.
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University; J.D. 1983, Columbia University. The author would like to thank Steve Thel, Ron
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1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure m their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV
2. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
3. This maxim is not a product of the English common law; rather, it dates back much
further. "Even in ancient times there were evidences of that same concept in custom and
law, partly as a result of the natural desire for privacy, partly an outgrowth, in all
probability, of the emphasis placed by the ancients upon the home as a place of hospitality,
shelter, and protection." NELSON B. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONsTITUION 13 (1970).
4. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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At the same time, "not very nice people" 5 raise most Fourth
Amendment claims. For some, this fact makes the Fourth Amend-
ment the scourge of the criminal justice system. Fourth Amend-
ment rules handcuff the police in their never ending battle to bring
criminals to book. Moreover, many people believe that the amend-
ment is responsible for releasing dangerous felons simply because
the police have failed to obey its technical requirements.6
Thus, the Fourth Amendment poses an enormous dilemma. How
important is privacy and personal security9 How much power
should the police have9 The entity primarily responsible for edu-
cating the public and the police about the Fourth Amend-
ment-the United States Supreme Court-has often tried, without
much success, to alleviate society's confusion about the amend-
ment.7 In the last two decades, the modern Court, led by Chief
Justices Warren Burger and William Rehnquist, has articulated its
view of the central meaning of the provision.
According to the Court, the central meaning of the Fourth
Amendment is "reasonableness." The Court wants us to believe
5. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
6. Despite this public perception, many scholars have argued that the impact of the ex-
clusion of evidence in criminal prosecutions because of police violations of the Fourth
Amendment has been greatly exaggerated by the Court. See, e.g., Donald Dripps, Living
with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 915-16 (1986); Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The
Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRnih L. REv. 85, 87-89
(1984); see generally Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need
to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies
of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 611 (concluding that the 1982 National Insti-
tute of Justice study, which claims that the exclusionary rule has a major impact on the
disposition of felony arrests, is misleading and exaggerated); Peter F Nardulli, The Societal
Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 585
(illustrating that exclusionary rules exact marginal societal costs).
7. One scholar argues, for instance, that the confusing nature of the Fourth Amendment
is
the result of the Court's attempt to pursue a compromise between considering
cases flexibly, on the grounds of the reasonableness of police behavior, and set-
ting forth clear rules, which, if the police fail to follow them, will lead to evi-
dentiary exclusion. The Court purports to set forth clear rules while actually
adjusting them constantly to accommodate each new fact situation.
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MicH. L. REv. 1468, 1472
(1985).
8. It is important to note that the term "reasonableness" may have two different mean-
ings. "Students of the fourth amendment quickly learn that for courts and commentators
'reasonableness' is both a term of art synonymous with constitutionality and a convenient
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that the provision merely commands that law enforcement officers
act rationally and pursue reasonable goals when they intrude upon
individuals and their possessions. Whether a particular search or
seizure is reasonable is generally determined by balancing the com-
peting interests at stake-the government's interest in effective
law enforcement versus the individual's interest in privacy and
personal security.
As an intuitive matter, the'Fourth Amendment appears to sup-
port a reasonableness test to judge police intrusions because it
speaks of "unreasonable searches and seizures." The question is
how the Court decides what is "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court, of course, could define reasonableness as
requiring that the police obtain a warrant before invading an indi-
vidual's privacy or personal security unless an exigency makes that
requirement impractical or impossible.9 The Court, however, de-
fines what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in a very
different manner. Under the Court's analytical model, law enforce-
ment officials rarely must comply with the procedural safeguards
of the amendment's Warrant Clause-safeguards that include
probable cause, judicial oversight of police intrusions, and warrants
particularly describing the place to be searched or persons to be
seized.
Instead, Fourth Amendment questions are resolved using a test
that approximates the rational basis standard, which is the test
used to decide equal protection and due process challenges to so-
cial and economic legislation. 10 Under the Court's analysis, Fourth
shorthand denoting a process of rational analysis." Ronald J. Bacigal, The Fourth Amend-
ment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L. FORUM 763, 763.
9. See California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1992 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Al-
though the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly impose the requirement of a warrant, it
is of course textually possible to consider that implicit within the requirement of
reasonableness.").
10. See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (1992) (holding that
a city's failure to tram or warn its employees about risks of harm was not arbitrary or con-
science-shocking to amount to a substantive due process violation, and that the Court
presumes that "the administration of Government programs is based on a rational decision-
making process that takes account of competing social, political, and economic forces");
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1987) (stating that a statute
normally "survive[s] an equal protection attack so long as the challenged classification is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose"). Other scholars have made a sumi-
lar argument in critiquing the Court's Fourth Amendment rules. See, e.g., Ronald J. Bacigal,
1993] 199
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Amendment complaints are upheld only when the police act irra-
tionally If the Court can identify any plausible goal or reason that
promotes law enforcement interests, the challenged police intru-
sion is considered reasonable and the constitutional inquiry is over.
Throughout the twenty-plus years of the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, some of the Justices have attempted to bolster this view of
the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment by pointing to the
text of the amendment, as well as the history surrounding its adop-
tion. These Justices correctly note that the language of the Fourth
Amendment does not mandate expressly that law enforcement offi-
cials obtain warrants prior to every search or seizure.1 The amend-
ment simply guarantees a right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.
These Justices also argue that the history of the Fourth Amend-
ment provides no support for the view that all warrantless searches
and seizures were condemned by those who framed and ratified the
amendment. 2 Far from requiring judicial warrants for all govern-
ment intrusions, the framers of the Fourth Amendment viewed ju-
dicial warrants as an evil and sought to limit their use. Numerous
statutes, regulations, and common law rules authorizing warrant-
less intrusions, all on the books during the colonial era and after
the adoption of the Constitution, appear to support the claim that
many early Americans were not concerned with warrantless
searches and seizures.' 3 The history surrounding the Fourth
Amendment, so the argument goes, provides no support for the no-
tion that the amendment grants individuals a right to be free from
warrantless searches and seizures.' 4 On the contrary, the plain lan-
guage and original understanding of the freedoms guaranteed by
Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth Amendment, 46 GE.o. WASIL
L. REV. 529, 564 (1978); Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A
Roadblock to Meaningful Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
285, 288 (1991).
11. See Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1992 (Scalia, J., concurring); Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
12. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 57 , 611 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Gerard V Bradley, Present at the Creation? A Critical Guide to Weeks v.
United States and Its Progeny, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1031, 1041-46 (1986).
14. Id.
200 [Vol. 35:197
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the Fourth Amendment do no more than prescribe that govern-
ment intrusions be limited to reasonable measures."
This Essay discusses whether the text, historical background,
and purpose of the Fourth Amendment support the Court's cur-
rent model for constructing constitutional principles in today's so-
ciety My purpose here is not to provide a comprehensive survey of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the last twenty years. Rather,
my goal is to sketch some of the main arguments in support of the
Court's theory that the Fourth Amendment merely requires ra-
tional police behavior, and outline some of the difficulties I see in
this particular jurisprudential model of search and seizure law.
While questioning the merit of the Court's current model, I hope
to show that the Court has ignored or distorted the history of the
Fourth Amendment. The constitutional lodestar for understanding
the Fourth Amendment is not an ad hoc reasonableness standard;
rather, the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust
of police power and discretion. 6 When viewed this way, the Fourth
15. In the view of one scholar, the "prune purpose" of the framers of the Fourth Amend-
ment "was to prohibit the oppressive use of warrants, and they were not at all concerned
about searches without warrants. They took for granted that arrested persons could be
searched without a search warrant, and nothing gave them cause for worry about warrant-
less searches." TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 43 (1969).
16. I am not suggesting that police officers are inherently untrustworthy or bad people.
Instead, my point concerns who controls police power. Playing on society's ignorance and
natural fear of crime, police officers and their representatives argue that only they know
what it is like to be a cop. They contend that "outsiders" are in no position to second-guess
their conduct. See, e.g., H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 24 (1988) ("IT]he cop believes
deep down that he himself is most favorably positioned to perceive the action, understand
the behavior of the players, and recognize the dictates of justice.").
For the most part, the public has accepted this argument. Understandably, society has
aligned itself with law enforcement interests. People do trust the police. A diminishment of
law enforcement power can be, and often is, characterized as a threat to the well-being of
society. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542-43 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). More
than 20 years ago, Fred Graham wrote that "society has proved more fearful of police impo-
tence than of police brutality." FREUD P GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 123 (1970).
Things have not changed much.
Society, however, should wean itself off the notion that the police do not need to be regu-
lated by citizens or judges. Where officers must act quickly to protect themselves or others
from danger, the police have the authority to take decisive actions. But an officer's decision
to make an arrest, to detain and question a person or search a motorist's purse or car, can
and should be subjected to vigorous and independent oversight. The pursuit of perceived
criminal behavior is a "competitive enterprise" that often results in zealous and excessive
police reactions. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). The Fourth Amend-
ment is a counterweight to such reactions. It is also a reminder to all of us that the Consti-
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Amendment synchronizes with other parts of the Constitution
designed to limit governmental powers. 17 At a minimum, the
Fourth Amendment commands compelling reasons, or at least a
substantial justification, before a warrantless search or seizure is
declared reasonable.
This Essay starts by discussing whether the Fourth Amend-
ment's text mandates the current model now utilized for construct-
ing search and seizure rules. It then sketches and considers the two
central historical premises of those who advocate this model: that
at the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights, our constitutional
ancestors (1) were not concerned with warrantless searches, and (2)
saw judges and warrants as potent tools of oppressive governmen-
tal power. Finally, the Essay considers one area of the Court's
Fourth Amendment doctrine, the search of private containers, to
illustrate the dangers a rational basis model poses for Fourth
Amendment freedoms.
II. DOES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT MERELY REQUIRE RATIONAL
POLICE INTRUSIONS, OR ARE WARRANTS THE PREFERRED MODE OF
PROCEDURE FOR SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 9
During the twentieth century, debate among the Justices and be-
tween scholars has focused on the relationship between the Fourth
Amendment's two clauses. One side of the debate argues that the
clauses of the amendment are independent declarations. The first
clause, the Reasonableness Clause, merely guarantees a freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures. The second clause, the
Warrant Clause, merely specifies the form and content of search
and arrest warrants. Accordingly, the proponents of a rational ba-
sis model contend that the Fourth Amendment does not always
require that police intrusions be authorized by a judicial warrant.'
tution places our individual interests in privacy, personal security, and human dignity on a
higher plane than society's interest in catching criminals.
17. Cf. Bacigal, supra note 10, at 558 ("The Bill of Rights in general and the fourth
amendment in particular are restrictions on unfettered governmental power rather than re-
flections of natural law rights.") (footnote omitted).
18. For instance, the Supreme Court in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950),
stated:
It is appropriate to note that the Constitution does not say that the right of
the people to be secure in their persons should not be violated without a search
[Vol. 35:197
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The classic application of this model was United States v. Rabi-
nowitz.19 Relying on the language and history of the amendment, a
majority of the Court wrote that "[i]t is unreasonable searches that
are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment," and it "was recognized
by the framers of the Constitution that there were reasonable
searches for which no warrant was required. '20 How would the
Court know whether a challenged police intrusion violated the
Fourth Amendment? Eschewing clear rules, the Rabinowitz major-
ity explained that the question of reasonableness "must find reso-
lution in the facts and circumstances of each case."21
The other side of the debate favors the "warrant preference"
rule. Initially led by Justice Frankfurter,2 this side contends that
the Warrant Clause modifies the first clause-a reasonable search
depends upon the authorization of a valid warrant.23 While not an
warrant if it is practicable for the officers to procure one. The mandate of the
Fourth Amendment is that the people shall be secure against unreasonable
searches.
Id. at 60. See also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947) ("The Fourth Amend-
ment has never been held to require that every valid search and seizure be effected under
the authority of a search warrant.").
19. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
20. Id. at 60 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 63; see also td. at 66 ("The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in turn
depends upon the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case.").
Interestingly, Rabinowitz' ringing endorsement of a reasonableness model apparently con-
tradicted the view articulated in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), which had
been decided a year and a half earlier. In ruling that the Fourth Amendment barred the
warrantless seizure of contraband materials discovered on private property, materials which
the government had known of for several weeks, the Truptano majority declared:
It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents
must secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable. This
rule rests upon the desirability of having magistrates rather than police officers
determine when searches and seizures are permissible and what limitations
should be placed upon such activities.
Id. at 705 (citations omitted).
22. See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 68-86 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Harris, 331 U.S. at
162 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 605 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
23. In his dissenting opinion in Rabinowitz, Justice Frankfurter wrote:
What is the test of reason which makes a search reasonable? There must
be a warrant to permit search, barring only inherent limitations upon that re-
quirement when there is a good excuse for not getting a warrant, i.e., the justi-
fications that dispense with search warrants when searching the person in his
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:197
absolutist view, this position held that a warrant was a necessary
precondition of a reasonable search, unless there was a compelling
reason for proceeding without one.24 Proponents of the warrant
preference rule do not claim that the text of the amendment re-
quires this rule.25 Instead, they argue that history and the experi-
ence of the founding fathers support the view that a search is un-
reasonable unless authorized by a warrant. 6
The warrant preference rule grew in stature during the latter
half of the 1960's and the early 1970's.27 Emphasizing the impor-
tance of a judicial check on intrusive governmental searches, the
Court often declared that "searches conducted outside of the judi-
cial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject only to a
extension, which is his body and that which his body can immediately control,
and moving vehicles.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 83 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
In his dissent in Harris, Justice Frankfurter explained that the Fourth Amendment's ref-
erence to "unreasonable" searches means "that, with minor and severely confined excep-
tions, inferentially a part of the Amendment, every search and seizure is unreasonable when
made without a magistrate's authority expressed through a validly issued warrant." Harris,
331 U.S. at 162 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
24. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he framers said with all
the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes
it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.").
25. But cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (stating that it is "perfectly
clear that the evil the Amendment was designed to prevent was broader than the abuse of a
general warrant," and that "[u]nreasonable searches or seizures conducted without any war-
rant at all are condemned by the plain language of the first clause of the Amendment").
26. See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 69-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Davis, 328 U.S. at 605
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 396-97 (1974) (discussing the scope, application
and restrictions of the Fourth Amendment).
27. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 585; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
309-10 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102, 105-07 (1965). The above citations notwithstanding, it would be disingenuous
to pretend that the Court of the late 1960's and the 1970's applied the warrant preference
rule in a principled or consistent manner. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,
414-24 (1976) (holding a routine warrantless arrest valid even where officers had time to
obtain warrant prior to arrest); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974) (holding
a warrantless search of a detainee's clothing reasonable while he was in custody after arrest
and that the constitutional standard is not "whether it was reasonable to procure a search
warrant, but whether the search itself was reasonable"); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
448 (1973) (finding a warrantless search of a vehicle's trunk reasonable notwithstanding the
fact that the vehicle was completely under the control of the police).
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few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. ' 2
While the warrant preference rule appeared to guide much of the
Court's search and seizure doctrine during this time, a persistent
opposition always existed which prevented the Court from speak-
ing with a unified voice on the central meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. For example, Justice White often challenged the view
that a warrant was necessary for upholding a challenged search or
seizure, and he urged the Court to adopt a balancing model for
judging the validity of governmental intrusions. 9 After he was ap-
pointed to the Court, then-Justice Rehnquist followed Justice
White's lead by arguing that the Fourth Amendment only required
that police intrusions be reasonable.3 0
As the Court enters the 1990's led by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
its view of the Fourth Amendment has traveled full circle. As was
the case when Rabinowitz was decided, the Court again formulates
Fourth Amendment rules around an ad hoc test, and provides only
occasional lip service to the warrant preference rule.31 While Chief
28. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (footnotes omitted).
29. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 607-20 (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 423 (1976); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 522 (1971) (White, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); Chnmel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 772-73 (1969)
(White, J., dissenting).
30. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the "judicially created preference for a warrant as indicating satisfaction of the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment" by arguing that "nothing in the
Fourth Amendment itself requires that searches be conducted pursuant to warrants," but
rather, "[tihe terms of the Amendment simply mandate that the people be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and that any warrants which may issue shall only issue
upon probable cause"); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 224-25 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (arguing that reasonableness is the "ultimate standard" in Fourth Amend-
ment cases, and that the pre-existence of a valid arrest warrant is "highly relevant" to the
question of whether it is reasonable for the police to search for the subject of that arrest
warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant); Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 406 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[T]he constitutionality of a particular search is a question of reasonableness and depends
on 'a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free
from arbitrary interference by law officers.' ") (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
31. The Court continues to pay lip service to the notion that warrantless searches are the
exception rather than the rule. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (noting in dicta that "[iln most criminal cases, [the Court] strike[s]
th[e] balance in favor of the procedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment"). In many cases, however, including criminal cases, the Court's holdings indi-
cate that the Warrant Clause is not being applied in a serious manner. See, e.g., California
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Justice Rehnquist's views are well known, other members of the
Court have also endorsed the current rational basis standard.3 2 In-
v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868 (1987). For a critical review of some of these cases, see Tracey Maclin, Justice
Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723
(1992). For a notable exception to this charge, see Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987),
where a majority of the Court rejected the rational basis model urged by the dissenters, and
instead, adhered to "the textual and traditional standard of probable cause" to invalidate a
warrantless search. Id. at 329.
Of course, it might be said that the Court's latest shift away from the warrant preference
rule is attributable to the consolidation of a certain political majority on the Court rather
than the product of sincere confusion about the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Professor Lloyd Weinreb stated that declarations from the Court
which casually reject or disregard what was said before and treat the warrant
clause either as an insignificant hurdle or as a deus ex machina with which to
strike down a disfavored search, do no more than announce the latest shift of
emphasis to one clause or the other, according to a result reached on other
grounds.
Lloyd L. Wemreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Cmi. L. REv. 47, 48-49
(1974).
32. Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinions in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 772
(1979), and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1977), and his majority opinion in
California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991), which overruled Sanders, indicated opposition
to the warrant preference rule, at least in the context of private container searches. Simi-
larly, Justice Stevens' majority opinion in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982),
showed little concern with the interests protected by the Warrant Clause. Justice Stevens
seemed to back away from this view, however, in his dissent to Acevedo, in which he stated
that "even proof beyond a reasonable doubt will not justify a warrantless search that is not
supported by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement." Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at
2000.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in National Treasury Employees Union v. von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989), upholding suspicionless drug testing for customs officers, minimized the
importance of the Warrant Clause's procedural safeguards. Justice Kennedy stated that
"neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor any measure of individualized suspicion, is
an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance [to support a search]."
Id. at 665 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor generally has favored a balancing model
that determines reasonableness on a case by case basis. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 25-26 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Her opinion for the Court in United States v.
Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985), enlarged police authority to conduct warrantless searches of
private containers even when no exigency justified such a search. Id. at 487-88. In Johns,
Justice O'Connor stated that "inasmuch as the Government was entitled to seize the pack-
ages and could have searched them immediately without a warrant, we conclude that the
warrantless search three days after the packages were [secured] was reasonable and consis-
tent with our precedent involving searches of impounded vehicles." Id. Justice Scalia's views
are discussed tnfra notes 60, 147-55 and accompanying text.
As of the time this Essay was written, neither Justice Souter nor Justice Thomas had
authored an opinion expressing his views on the Fourth Amendment, although Justice Sou-
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deed, for the foreseeable future, the rational basis model likely will
remain the constitutional test for judging government intrusions,
whereas the importance and need to obtain warrants likely will
continue to decline.
II1. WHAT CAN WE LEARN ABOUT THE CENTRAL MEANING OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT FROM THE TEXT OF THE PROVISION ?
Is the Court's embrace of a rational basis model constitutionally
justifiable? To be sure, the Fourth Amendment's language does not
require that all searches and seizures be authorized by a warrant.33
ter has joined several of the Court's opinions that adopt the current rational basis model.
See Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1982; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 177; Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1
(1990). Both Justices Souter and Thomas joined the Court's opinion in Minnesota v. Dicker-
son, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993), where the Court once again extended the rationale of Terry v.
Ohio, 398 U.S. 1 (1968), to allow the seizure of contraband discovered through an officer's
sense of touch during a protective frisk for weapons.
33. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 ("For the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe
all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable."); see also Akhil R. Amar,
The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1179-80 (1991) (criticizing the
modem Court for ignoring the plain language of the Fourth Amendment, and arguing that
"[flt is not that a search or seizure without a warrant was presumptively unreasonable, as
the Court has assumed; rather, a search or seizure with a warrant was presumed reasonable
as a matter of law-and thus immune from jury oversight."); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did)
(Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical
Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 576 (1983) ("Although the Fourth Amendment
establishes gidelines for the issuance of search warrants, it has nothing to say specifically
about warrantless searches."); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment's Two
Clauses, 26 Ari. CraM. L. REV. 1389, 1390 (1989) (observing that the warrant preference rule
seems to be "at odds with a literal reading of the fourth amendment"). But cf. Weinreb,
supra note 31, at 47 ("A thoughtful and strict grammarian might conclude from the struc-
ture of the amendment that the second clause is a partial explication of the first, so that any
search conducted without a warrant is, by that fact alone, unreasonable.").
While conceding that the text of the amendment does not mandate warrants for all
searches and seizures expressly, advocates of the warrant preference rule have raised several
arguments supporting the view that the text and structure of the Fourth Amendment justify
a warrant requirement for most searches. For example, one commentator argued that
[t]he general right of security from unreasonable search and seizure was given
a sanction of its own [in the Reasonableness Clause] and the amendment thus
intentionally given a broader scope. That the prohibition against "unreasona-
ble searches" was intended, accordingly, to cover something other than the
form of the warrant is a question no longer left to implication to be derived
from the phraseology of the Amendment.
LAssON, supra note 3, at 103 (footnote omitted). Another commentator contended that
the Fourth Amendment made no provision for the warrantless search any more
than it did for the general search warrant. It would be strange, to say the
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Conceding this fact, however, does not end the matter. When con-
struing any constitutional provision, the language of the document
is the obvious place to begin the analysis. Yet, when interpreting
the Fourth Amendment one should be careful about the weight
placed on its literal terms, s4 particularly if the reader is trying to
ascertain the "original intent" of the framers and those who rati-
fied the provision.
There is good reason to believe that the precise language of the
Fourth Amendment was not particularly important to the found-
ing fathers. The precept that was initially proposed by James
Madison to govern the issuance of warrants underwent significant
changes due to the enterprising efforts of a single congressman. 5
least, for the amendment to specify stringent warrant requirements, after hav-
Ing in effect negated these by authorizing judicially unsupervised "reasonable"
searches without warrant. To detach the first clause from the second is to run
the risk of making the second virtually useless.
JACOB W LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 43-44 (1966). See also
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) ("It is thus perfectly clear that the evil the
Amendment was designed to prevent was broader than the abuse of a general warrant. Un-
reasonable searches or seizures conducted without any warrant at all are condemned by the
plain language of the first clause of the Amendment."); Kamisar, supra, at 574 (contending
that it was incumbent upon the judiciary to interpret the amendment "to prohibit indis-
criminate, arbitrary and unjustified warrantless searches as well").
34. Like other general provisions in the Constitution, the text of the Fourth Amendment
leaves many important questions, including the relationship of the amendment's two
clauses, unanswered. The Warrant Clause, for instance, does not explain "who may issue a
warrant, how it must be executed, [and] in what circumstances seized property may be re-
tamed." Weinreb, supra note 31, at 47 n.1.
35. Madison's original draft was aimed only at improper warrants. It stated:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their pa-
pers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or
the persons or things to be seized.
1 ANNALS OF CONG., cols. 434-35 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
Madison's draft was reported to the full House of Representatives with a few minor
changes, but the essence of his original proposal remained and was directed against general
warrants. LASSON, supra note 3, at 101. Congressman Benson, however, was not satisfied
with the reported provision. He proposed several changes that he felt would strengthen the
provision, but his alterations were rejected by the House. Id.
Benson, however, did not accept defeat. As chairman of a committee appointed to arrange
the amendments, Benson replaced the agreed-upon amendment with the defeated version
he had proposed. Id. Benson's substitute provision was never "noticed or assented to as
such by the House." Id. at 102-03. The altered provision was later enacted by both houses of
Congress, and subsequently ratified by the States. Id. at 103.
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Madison's proposal, "a one-barrelled affair, directed apparently
only to the essentials of a valid warrant," 6 was altered by Con-
gressman Benson to a "double-barrelled form"' 7 that seems to pro-
vide for "two constitutional mandates where only one had existed
before. '3 s The changes to Madison's draft escaped the notice of
members of the House and Senate, and the altered provision was
approved by Congress and ratified by the state constitutional con-
ventions without extensive discussion regarding the precise lan-
guage of what later became the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution.3
When considering this undisputed history, "there is little reason
to suppose that a literal interpretation of the fourth amendment
will accurately reflect the intentions of its Framers or help us de-
termie what, if anything, they thought about the relationship be-
tween the amendments' [sic] two clauses. ' 40 Thus, it is "especially
bizarre" 41 for the current Court to point to the text of the Fourth
Amendment to justify its rejection of the warrant preference rule.
The framers and ratifiers did not focus on the precise language of
the amendment, and their thoughts on the relationship between
the amendment's two clauses remain a mystery 42 If our constitu-
36. LASSON, supra note 3, at 103. Professor Lasson explained that under Madison's origi-
nal version, "[t]he general principle of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure seems
to have been stated only by way of premise, and the positive inhibition upon action by the
Federal Government limited consequently to the issuance of warrants without probable
cause, etc." Id.
37. Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 468 n.465.
38. Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of "Search" in the
Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IowA L. REV. 541, 552 (1988). The
significance of the changes made to Madison's draft remains a subject of debate. Professor
Lasson, for example, concluded that after Congressman Benson's changes, "[tihe general
right of security from unreasonable search and seizure was given a sanction of its own and
the amendment thus intentionally given a broader scope." LASSON, supra note 3, at 103.
Professor Taylor, on the other hand, after asserting that "it was the warrant which was the
initial and primary object of the [fourth] amendment," concluded that "[n]othing in the
legislative history of the fourth amendment sheds much light on the purpose of the first
clause." TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 43.
39. LASSON, supra note 3, at 101-03.
40. Wasserstrom, supra note 33, at 1391.
41. Id.
42. As Professor Bacigal noted, "[h]istory has thus identified the question of the relation-
ship of the amendment's clauses, but has not provided an answer." Ronald J. Bacigal, Dodg-
ing a Bullet, but Opening Old Wounds in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 SETON
HALL L. REV. 597, 609 (1986).
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tional ancestors were not preoccupied with a narrow, textual view
of the Fourth Amendment, how can today's Court adopt such a
view in the name of "original intent"9
Another reason why a literal reading of the Fourth Amendment
fails to support the Court's rational basis model is that the model
makes no sense when utilized as a tool for interpreting the first
clause of the Fourth Amendment. The framers of the amendment
believed that they were providing substantive protection against
governmental invasions of persons, homes, papers and effects. 3
Even assuming that the Warrant Clause does not explicate the
Reasonableness Clause, the Court still must explain the purpose of
the Reasonableness Clause. That clause guarantees "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."'44 Under the
current test, the Court decides whether the police have violated
this guarantee of reasonable searches and seizures by asking
whether they have acted in a reasonable and rational manner.
Such a formula lacks content, and amounts to nothing more than
43. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 610 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (stating
that the Reasonableness Clause "reaffirms the basic principle of common law [prohibitions
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and] assumes an existing right against ac-
tions in excess of that inherent power and ensures that it remain inviolable"); Bacigal, supra
note 42 (noting throughout the article, cases in which the Court has recognized substantive
values contained in the Reasonableness Clause that are unrelated to the procedural stan-
dards of the Warrant Clause); Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Consti-
tution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally
Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907, 909 (1989) ("First and foremost, fourth amendment
rights are substantive as opposed to procedural rights."); Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 874 (1985) ("[S]eizures of papers were
condemned in eighteenth-century England without respect to the validity of any underlying
warrant, and the [Reasonableness Clause] thus embodies requirements independent of the
warrant clause."); see also Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 321 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("By reason of the Fourth Amendment the police may not rum-
mage around among [certain] personal effects, no matter how formally perfect their author-
ity may appear to be. Any invasion whatsoever of those personal effects is 'unreasona-
ble' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
Even Telford Taylor, the academic trailblazer for those rejecting the warrant preference
rule, acknowledges that the amendment's first clause embodies a value that "transcends the
procedural safeguards of particularity and probability in the second clause." TAYLOR, supra
note 15, at 67.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. IV
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an ad hoc judgment about the desirability of certain police
intrusions.
45
One solution for this standardless process is to seek refuge in the
common law 46 Under this alternative, the Reasonableness Clause
grants the same protection that the common law provided.47 But
this response does not justify rejection of the warrant preference
45. Justice Frankfurter put it well when he noted:
To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of rea-
son. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for district judges or the police to
say that an "unreasonable search" is forbidden-that the search must be rea-
sonable. What is the test of reason which makes a search reasonable?
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
In a similar vein, Professor White has observed that a reasonableness model inherently is
subject to manipulation by the Court: "We may be on the threshold of a Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence in which the only question is whether the Supreme Court believes a
police practice to be 'reasonable.' No one can know what meaning will be given such a
term." James B. White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A
Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 165, 171.
Finally, Professor Amsterdam aptly noted that under an ad hoc reasonableness model,
"reasonableness is in the first instance for the [trial court] to determine."
What it means in practice is that appellate courts defer to trial courts and trial
courts defer to the police. What other results should we expect? If there are no
fairly clear rules telling the policeman what he may and may not do, courts are
seldom going to say that what he did was unreasonable.
Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 394 (quoting Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63) (footnote omitted).
46. See Bradford Wilson, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understand-
ing, 28 CATH. LAW. 173, 186 (1983) ("By incorporating the common law doctrine regarding
searches and seizures into its charter of national existence, the people of the United States
gave it constitutional status, thereby placing all controversies arising under that law within
the realm of the federal judicial power.").
47. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1993 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(asserting that the confusion surrounding the amendment's interpretation can be resolved
"by returning to the first principle that the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth
Amendment affords the protection that the common law afforded"); Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's conclusion that "the
Fourth Amendment proscribes a police practice that was accepted at the time of the adop-
tion of the Bill of Rights and has continued to receive the support of many state legisla-
tures" and arguing instead that "fidelity to the notion of constitutional-as opposed to
purely judicial-limits on governmental action requires us to impose a heavy burden on
those who claim that practices accepted when the Fourth Amendment was adopted are now
constitutionally impermissible") (citations omitted); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204,
227 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (relying upon the common law that "existed at the
time of the framing of the Fourth Amendment, which incorporated the standard of 'reason-
ableness' "); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 610 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Reasonableness Clause "was directed towards safeguarding the rights at common
law").
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rule; it only begs the question why law enforcement practices ac-
cepted by the common law should be the measure of the amend-
ment today 48 Nothing magical about the English common law ex-
isted at the time the Fourth Amendment was ratified. Indeed,
construction of Fourth Amendment principles from English com-
mon law rules seems inapt because the American colonists "re-
belled against English search and seizure practices."4 Moreover,
the common law rules of that era provide only a "snapshot" of the
authority of constables and customs officers in 1791. Times have
changed. Law enforcement methods have become more compli-
cated and serious. Our notions of privacy and personal security
have also changed. Indeed, in certain instances, a rigid or senti-
mental attachment to common law rules may aggravate social ten-
sions, leading to more community harm and less, rather than more,
effective law enforcement. 50
As a practical matter, common law rules are insufficient for de-
ciding current Fourth Amendment cases. Those who framed and
48. As Justice Thurgood Marshall cogently noted:
The common-law rules governing searches and arrests evolved in a society far
simpler than ours is today. Crime has changed, as have the means of law en-
forcement, and it would therefore be naive to assume that those actions a con-
stable could take in an English or American village three centuries ago should
necessarily govern what we, as a society, now regard as proper.
Steagald, 451 U.S. at 217 n.10.
49. Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illi-
nois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465, 478 (1984).
50. The use of deadly and excessive force by the police often generates tension between
the police and minority citizens. See Anna Quindlen, Deadly Force, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
1990, at E23 (stating that people who live in minority neighborhoods "think white police
officers are quick on the trigger in neighborhoods like theirs, where the people are all black
or Hispanic"); see also Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police
Department 69 (1991) (Police officers polled in a Los Angeles Police Department survey
agreed that "racial bias on the part of officers toward minority citizens currently exists and
contributes to a negative interaction between police and the community." The same survey
revealed that 27% of the officers agreed that " 'an officer's prejudice towards the suspect's
race may lead to the use of excessive force.' ").
The common law, however, permitted the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon
even in cases where the escaping suspect posed no threat to an officer or the public. In
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Court ruled that the use of deadly force under
such circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 7-22. "[Allthough the common
law pedigree of Tennessee's rule is pure on its face, changes in the legal and technological
context mean the rule is distorted almost beyond recognition when literally applied." Id. at
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ratified the Fourth Amendment undoubtedly opposed the general
warrants used in England and the writs of assistance utilized by
colonial customs officers. There is universal agreement that these
law enforcement tools were the specific evils the framers intended
to condemn through the Fourth Amendment.51 But can (or should)
we infer from this history that the framers and ratifiers had no
qualms about other law enforcement practices that were not atop
the Revolutionary list of grievances during the late 1780's?52 I
think not. Professor Amsterdam is surely correct to note that
"[t]he agreement of many minds upon the decision to disapprove
particular practices does not signify the least agreement to approve
other practices not upon the agenda. '53
When constructing Fourth Amendment rules for modern society,
the Court should not be preoccupied with the permissible law en-
forcement practices of the eighteenth century Instead, the Court
must focus on the "underlying visin 54 of the amendment, which
"places the magistrate as a buffer between the police and the citi-
zenry, so as to prevent the police from acting as judges in their
51. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-27 (1886); LASSON, supra
note 3, at 51-105; TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 38-44.
52. It is interesting to note that the Declaration of Independence did not contain "any
direct reference to general warrants, writs of assistance, or the principle of freedom from
unreasonable search." LASSON, supra note 3, at 80.
53. Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 398; see also John Apol, The Fourth Amendment: His-
torical Perspective, Warrantless Searches, and a Solution to the Exclusionary Rule De-
bate, 1991 DET. C.L. Rav. 1205, 1210. The Supreme Court used similar reasoning in United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In rejecting the government's argument that the War-
rant Clause was exclusively aimed at unjustified intrusions into private homes, and not in-
tended to cover warrantless searches of effects outside of the home, the Court noted:
The absence of a contemporary outcry against warrantless searches in public
places was because, aside from searches incident to arrest, such warrantless
searches were not a large issue in colonial America. Thus, silence in the histori-
cal record tells us little about the Framers' attitude toward application of the
Warrant Clause to the search of respondents' footlocker.
Id. at 8-9.
54. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERicAN CONsTuIoNAL LAW 537 (2d ed. 1988). In analyzing
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2, Professor Tribe writes that "the
underlying vision of the framers-that the states not war with one another by discriminat-
ing against one another's citizens without good reason-should nonetheless be regarded as
giving rise to the dominant meaning of the clause even if the framers themselves may have
had a more limited set of examples in mmd." Id.
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own cause." 55 The framers undoubtedly feared general warrants,
and eighteenth century litigants apparently harbored no particular
objection to searches incident to arrest.56 But can we confidently
predict that our constitutional ancestors believed that government
eavesdropping and the use of undercover police spies and infor-
mants were reasonable practices?5 7 And, of course, it is impossible
to discern what early Americans thought, for example, about ran-
dom drug testing or warrantless aerial observations. 8
55. Jacob W Landynski, In Search of Justice Black's Fourth Amendment, 45 FORDHAM
L. REv. 453, 462 (1976).
56. See TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 45.
57. One scholar, for instance, noted the tension between a judicial order authorizing elec-
tronic surveillance and the "original understanding" of the Reasonableness Clause:
[T]he same logic which supports an ex parte order for a clandestine trespass
to install a[n electronic] bug would equally justify an order authorizing a
King's messenger to secrete himself in Wilkes' or Entick's home to overhear
and report any seditious or libellous murmurings. I am sure such a thing would
have been thought outrageously unlawful, and if there is a considered consen-
sus to the contrary today, I think it is a change for the worse.
Id. at 84-85. By contrast, Justice Black argued in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
that
[t]apping telephone wires, of course, was an unknown possibility at the time
the Fourth Amendment was adopted. But eavesdropping (and wiretapping is
nothing more than eavesdropping by telephone) was "an ancient practice
which at common law was condemned as a nuisance." There can be no
doubt that the Framers were aware of this practice, and if they had desired to
outlaw or restrict the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, I believe that
they would have used the appropriate language to do so in the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, The Scope
of the Fourth Amendment: Prwacy and the Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents, and In-
formers, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1193, 1235 (pointing out the difficulty in knowing
whether the framers of the Fourth Amendment ever considered explicitly the problem of
secret government spies "and decided that the practice did not pose a sufficiently serious
threat to privacy to warrant constitutional treatment or, rather, whether they simply did not
consider the problem at all").
58. Even in the case of the archetypical invasion-a forcible entry and search of an indi-
vidual's home, an intrusion the founding fathers knew well-the Court has been divided
sharply over the relevant common law rule. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220
(1981) (noting that the common law "sheds relatively little light" on the legality of a war-
rantless intrusion of a third party's home in search of the subject of a valid arrest warrant);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 598 (1980) ("In all events, the issue [whether the police
can conduct a warrantless intrusion of a home to effectuate a routine felony arrest] is not
one that can be said to have been definitively settled by the common law at the time the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.").
214
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The modern Court itself often finds that common law rules are
no panacea when devising constitutional principles for search and
seizure problems. 59 Even Justice Scalia, perhaps the Court's most
forceful advocate in relying upon the common law to give content
to constitutional precepts, resists an absolutist's view that the
scope of the Fourth Amendment's protective shield cannot expand
beyond the freedoms then existing at common law.60 Likewise, Jus-
59. See, e.g., Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-10 (1967) (overrul-
ing the common law rule that "mere evidence" could not be seized by government officials);
United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (rejecting the traditional view that
Fourth Amendment interests were not implicated unless there was a physical trespass by
government officials of protected property); Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
(reversing the historically accepted rule that municipal health inspections did not require a
warrant for entry into a private home).
Even Chief Justice Rehnquist has acknowledged, in a number of cases, the limits of a
strict adherence to the common law in devising Fourth Amendment rules. For example, in
Steagald he noted the
basic error in the Court's treatment of the common law is its reliance on the
adage that "a man's home is his castle." Though there is undoubtedly early
case support for this in the common law, it cannot be accepted as an uncritical
statement of black letter law which answers all questions in this area.
Steagald, 451 U.S. at 229. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), then-Justice Rehnquist
explained that "[e]xpectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, of course,
need not be based on a common-law interest in real or personal property, or on the invasion
of such an interest." Id. at 143 n.12. In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), Justice
Rehnquist concluded that a person standing in the doorway of her house was subject to a
warrantless arrest. Such an arrest was valid under the Fourth Amendment although com-
mon law conceptions of property would suggest otherwise. Justice Rehnquist explained:
While it may be true that under the common law of property the threshold of
one's dwelling is "private," as is the yard surrounding the house, it is nonethe-
less clear that under the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment Santana
was in a "public" place. She was not in an area where she had any expectation
of privacy.
Id. at 42. Finally, in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), Justice Rehnquist
noted that common law authorities were often "sparse" and "silent" on the question of
whether an officer has an unqualified authority to search incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at
230.
60. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2140 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting that a frisk for weapons on less than probable cause-although impermissible under
the common law-might be lawful today because the current availability of concealed weap-
ons "might alter the judgment of what is 'reasonable' under the original standard"); Califor-
nia v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1993 (1991) (noting that changes in the relevant legal rules
may make a warrant necessary to reasonableness where it was not required under the com-
mon law); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1672 (1991) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that a balancing analysis may be appropriate in "resolving novel questions
of search and seizure under the 'reasonableness' standard that the Fourth Amendment sets
forth" but that such a balancing approach may not be appropriate "in resolving those ques-
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tice White, who often urged the adoption of common law rules
during the 1960's and 1970's, recognized that common law princi-
ples do not always provide adequate solutions to search and
seizure questions.'
In sum, the text and ratification of the Fourth Amendment re-
veal little about how the framers intended the Fourth Amendment
to be interpreted. Moreover, a literal interpretation of the Reason-
ableness Clause produces tautological reasoning, and there is no
positive indication that the framers intended for common law
search and seizure rules to define the scope of the amendment.6 2
Nevertheless, critics of the warrant preference rule argue that the
framers were not concerned with warrantless searches, and saw
judges and warrants as the tools of oppressive government. I will
now consider both of these objections.
IV WARRANTLESS SEARCHES V JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES: WHO
WAS THE FRIEND AND WHO WAS THE FOE?
In 1969, Telford Taylor, the most widely cited critic of the war-
rant preference rule, wrote that "our constitutional fathers were
not concerned about warrantless searches, but about overreaching
warrants."6 Other scholars, following Taylor's lead, question
tions on which a clear answer already existed in 1791 and has been generally adhered to by
the traditions of our society ever since").
61. In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), Justice White wrote for the majority that
"reliance on the common-law rule [regarding the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing
felon] in this case would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a historical
inquiry." Id. at 13. Similarly, in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), Justice
White's majority opinion rejected the historic tradition that permitted administrative in-
spection without a warrant, which the Court had previously recognized as having-"anteced-
ents deep in our history." Id. at 527 (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959)).
Justice White also joined the majority opinions in several decisions that rejected narrow,
common law applications of the term "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. See Mc-
Laughlin, 111 S. Ct. at 1665; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1968); Katz, 389 U.S. at 362-
64; Hayden, 387 U.S. at 295, 310, 312.
62. See Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 467 n.464 (noting the absence in the "pre-constitu-
tional history [of] any affirmative evidence that the framers intended to make law enforce-
ment practices commonly used in their time, or even such practices as had then been judi-
cially approved, the measure of the amendment").
63. TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 41. Taylor draws support for this conclusion from the
"great cases of the early 1760's." Id. at 38-39 (referring to Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep.
1075 (K.B. 1765); Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765); Huckle v. Money, 95
Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763); and Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P 1763)). These cases,
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whether reliance upon warrants to promote Fourth Amendment
rights is consistent with history or wise constitutional policy" In
fact, one prominent scholar, arguing that juries played the primary
role in protecting Fourth Amendment freedoms, claims that war-
rants were "disfavored" during colonial times, and that "[j]udges
and warrants are the heavies, not the heroes, of [the Fourth
Amendment's] story "65
Two central premises fuel the critics' complaint against the war-
rant preference rule. The first holds that many warrantless
searches did not trouble the framers of the Fourth Amendment.
The second concerns the institutional role of judges and warrants
under the Fourth Amendment. Judges were often the primary
source for issuing warrants, and because the framers saw warrants
as devices to expand governmental authority rather than constrain
it, the critics suggest that Fourth Amendment interests would be
according to Taylor, "involved searches under the authority of warrants, and none of
the parties was at all concerned about warrantless searches incident to arrest." Id. at 39.
Taylor further asserts that the framers did not envision the judicial "warrant as a protec-
tion against unreasonable searches, [but] saw it as an authority for unreasonable and
oppressive searches." Id. at 41. Taylor also is not surprised by the fact that the Fourth
Amendment lacks an express prohibition against warrantless searches:
The framers did not do this because their prime purpose was to prohibit the
oppressive use of warrants, and they were not at all concerned about searches
without warrants. They took for granted that arrested persons could be
searched without a search warrant, and nothing gave them cause for worry
about warrantless searches.
Id. at 43.
The consequence of Taylor's thesis for current search and seizure law has not escaped
critical review. See, e.g., LANDYNSIU, supra note 33, at 43-44; Amsterdam, supra note 26, at
410-14; Wasserstrom, supra note 33, at 1395-96.
64. See Amar, supra note 33, at 1175-81; Ronald J. Bacigal, A Case for Jury Determina-
tion of Search and Seizure Law, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 791 (1981); William J. Stuntz, War-
rants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 897-98 (1991); cf. Gerard V
Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DEPAUL L. REv. 817,
831, 862 (1989) (asserting that the "enumerated requisites of a valid warrant form the only
operative portion of the [fourth] amendment" and that the" 'reasonableness clause' has
no operative significance," but rather "places the government on notice that the measure of
appropriate search and seizure is that with which the people would burden themselves if
delegation of lawmaking authority to Congress was not obliged by the extended sphere of
the republic"); Bradley, supra note 13, at 1041 ("Warrantless searches, then as now, were
the rule rather than the exception, and each of the thirteen colonies, and then states, as a
common statutory practice, authorized them.").
65. Amar, supra note 33, at 1179.
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better served if the influence of judges and warrants was dimin-
ished 6 Both of these propositions are open to question.
The first point-that the "framers" were not concerned with
warrantless searches-is hard to prove. If the term "framers" is
meant literally, the critics are probably right. James Madison's
original draft for restraining the search and seizure powers of the
federal government was "directed against improper warrants
only 167 On the other hand, if attention is focused not on what
Madison perceived to be the chief evil of governmental search
powers, but rather on what angered "the people" about govern-
mental intrusions, 8 then we discover that larger concerns
animated those early Americans who fought against British
searches.
The Court often explains that our constitutional attitudes to-
ward governmental search and seizure power derive from the
abuses generated by writs of assistance and general warrants used
by British customs officials against colonial merchants and busi-
nessmen."9 Yet, before the writs of assistance became a major legal
battle in the colonies during the latter part of the eighteenth cen-
tury, and before John Wilkes attacked the use of the general war-
66. See id. at 1179-81.
67. LASSON, supra note 3, at 100. Of course, we now know that although Madison pro-
vided the initial wording of the provision, he did not have the last word on the Fourth
Amendment's ultimate phraseology. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
68. After all, the Fourth Amendment speaks of the "right of the people," not the rights of
the "framers," "citizens," or even the "property-owning" class of the United States. In light
of what we now know about how the Fourth Amendment's language came to be, see supra
notes 35-42 and accompanying text, it makes a lot more sense to focus on the perspective of
"the people" who fought against the writs of assistance rather than on the intent of the few
individuals who actually wrote the Constitution.
Moreover, when one considers that today "the people" who often assert Fourth Amend-
ment claims include the poor, racial and ethnic minorities and the disfavored members of
society (i.e., alleged criminals), constructing Fourth Amendment principles based upon the
"original intent" of the framers borders on the absurd. Whether the framers intended, for
example, to include blacks within the scope of the amendment's protection is open to de-
bate. See LASSON, supra note 3, at 95 n.61 (noting that proposals at the Virginia and New
York Constitutional Conventions provided that "every freeman" had a right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, while at the Rhode Island Constitutional Convention
"pains were deliberately taken to substitute 'person' for 'freeman' ").
69. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1978); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 625-27 (1886); see also Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond:
The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure
Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1369-71 (1983).
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rant in his famous 1763 trial in England,70 a particular type of war-
rantless search caused considerable controversy in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony and elsewhere. This was the search ex
officio conducted by British customs officers. The modern Court,
however, has not focused on this controversy, nor considered its
impact upon the historical events leading to the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment. More importantly, the Court has overlooked
the significance of this period in constructing a general theory
about the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The warrantless searches executed by British customs officers in
the early 1750's, "under which customs officers assumed a power of
forcible entry ex officw and which had been resisted physically or
contested at law," led to the landmark Writs of Assistance Case of
1761.71 Customs officers, acting without warrants or other judicial
authorization, forcibly entered private dwellings and warehouses
looking for smuggled goods.7 2 Customs officials claimed that their
70. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P 1763).
71. M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 108 (1978). Smith's book is "an impres-
sive accomplishment" and "a truly exhaustive study" of the English and colonial American
history of the period before and after the famous Writs of Assistance Case of 1761. Bruce H.
Mann, The Writs of Assistance Case, 11 CONN. L. REV. 353, 354, 355 (1979) (book review).
Anyone interested in understanding the history and events that led to the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment should read Smith's book. As one reviewer wrote: "It]he scholar who
stands on Smith's shoulders to study the fourth amendment will have a remarkable view."
Id. at 366.
72. The convergence of two interrelated events may help explain why ex officio searches
generated substantial agitation among merchants and business traders m mid-eighteenth
century Massachusetts.
First, prior to the 1750's, the vice-admiralty courts were ineffective institutions m combat-
ting illegal smuggling. Vice-admiralty courts were weak and ineffective because the Massa-
chusetts Superior Court, more influenced by "provincial politics" than the vice-admirality
courts, had been quite willing to issue writs of prohibition to the vice-admiralty courts.
SMITH, supra note 71, at 68-69. The writ of prohibition was an order from a common law
court to an inferior court to cease the adjudication of a matter on the grounds that the
inferior court did not have the jurisdiction to hear the matter. Up until the 1750's, the vice-
admiralty court was a "frequent target" of the superior court's writ of prohibition. Id. All of
this changed, however, when Governor William Shirley made two judicial appointments to
the Superior Court of individuals who were less beholden to local merchants and more def-
erential to vice-admiralty proceedings and executive power. Id. at 86-87.
The second event, somewhat related to the first, that may have helped increase ex officio
searches concerned a notice to local customs officers m Boston "to be very vigilant in discov-
ering and seizing all Contraband Goods." Id. at 74 (quoting an announcement run by
Sir Henry Frankland, Collector of Customs, in the BOSTON GAZETrE, Feb. 20, 1753). It is
possible that customs officers read this notice "not merely as an order to make searches but
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authority for these warrantless searches derived from their com-
missions or deputations.7 3 This claim not only lacked legal sup-
port,74 but many people in Massachusetts also strongly and vio-
lently contested it.7 5 So vehement was the opposition to ex officio
as implying that what their commissions said about a power of search meant a power to
break in." Id. at 118.
73. 3 THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHU-
sETrs-BAY 67 (Lawrence S. Mayo ed., 1936).
74. In THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE, Smith explains that "a power of search was not
something a customs officer could snatch out of the air: there had to be statutory foundation
for it." SMITH, supra note 71, at 117. This rule, however, was not always followed by customs
officers. "Some commissions cited no statute at all for the power of search they asserted;
and where that was not the case and the commission did identify the statute it drew upon,
that particular statute in fact said nothing whatever about a power of search." Id.
Notwithstanding the flimsy legal foundation that supported many customs officers' com-
missions, Smith explains that warrantless customs searches continued to occur without un-
due resistance until customs officers utilized heavy-handed methods of law enforcement:
What went wrong in Massachusetts perhaps was that moderation ceased to be
observed. According to the account in [Chief Justice Thomas] Hutchinson's
History, the "assumed authority" that people bridled at was customs officers
having "forcibly entered warehouses, and even dwellings houses. "The op-
erative word, one suspects, is "forcibly." It needed little more than a riffle
through familiar lawbooks-Hale's History of the Pleas of the Crown, for in-
stance-for any lawyer worth his fee to see that a power of forcible entry was
by no means to be inferred from a power of entry, and that without clear statu-
tory authority it could not lawfully exist.
Id. at 118.
75. Id. at 116-18. Joseph Frese also describes two incidents outside of Massachusetts in
which customs officers attempted warrantless searches, but were opposed by disgruntled
persons:
On one occasion in South Carolina, in 1715, the deputation does not seem to
have been of much value, for the customs officer was forcibly prevented from
searching even a ship. In Rhode Island, in 1718, the collector of the customs
found five smuggled hogsheads of claret but it is not known whether he used
his deputation or a search warrant. It made little difference for a mob gath-
ered, four of the barrels were staved in, and the collector threatened with his
life.
Joseph Frese, Writs of Assistance in the American Colonies 1660-1776, at 180 (1951) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (footnotes omitted).
Additional colonial resistance to warrantless search powers was also evident in Massachu-
setts in the year 1754 when a "noisy" pamphlet war erupted regarding an excise reform bill
designed to "close a loophole through which significant quantities of wine and spirits had
hitherto passed into consumption untaxed." SMITH, supra note 71, at 111. Although the
proposed law did not authorize searches of private dwellings, this fact did not quell the
hostility of many who saw the scheme as another effort to expand government search power.
The depth of the opposition to the bill was captured in the tone of one editorial:
But besides the Excise itself, the propos'd Manner of exacting it, is what can-
not but give very great Disgust, that it should be in the Power of a petty Of-
1993] CENTRAL MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
search powers, that Governor William Shirley in the summer of
1753 began issuing his own warrants to customs officers, hoping
that public hostility would subside.7 6 These gubernatorial war-
rants, however, rested on equally flimsy legal grounds."' Soon, they
too were abandoned in favor of the writs of assistance.78 Because
writs of assistance were generally issued by courts, rather than the
governor himself, they had a stronger legal basis than the guberna-
torial warrant.
In retrospect, when the critics of the warrant preference rule
write that pre-Revolutionary Americans were not bothered by war-
rantless searches, they are overlooking a little-discussed, 9 but very
important, segment of constitutional history I do not mean to im-
ply that this obscure piece of history provides every clue about
how our constitutional ancestors approached search and seizure
questions. Nor am I suggesting that the quarrel over forcible ex
officio searches left as lasting an impression in the colonial con-
sciousness as did James Otis, Jr.'s fiery 1761 speech attacking the
ficer to come into a Gentleman's House, and with an Air of Authority, demand
an Account upon Oath of the Liquor he has drank in his Family for the year
past.
Id. at 112. While the 1754 reform bill was enacted eventually, the pamphlet war against the
bill "showed how acutely sensitive people m Massachusetts could be to anything that
seemed to threaten the sanctity of their dwellings." Id. at 114.
76. SMITH, supra note 71, at 115.
77. Id. at 118-21. Smith explains that Governor Shirley probably looked to the Act of
Frauds of 1662, officially entitled An Act for preventing Frauds, and regulating Abuses in
His Majesty's Customs, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, cn.11 (Eng.), as the legal basis for his guberna-
torial warrants. SMITH, supra note 71, at 120-21.
The 1662 Act of Frauds permitted the issuance of writs of assistance, but the writs them-
selves did not authorize any power of search: the writ of assistance was not a search warrant,
but "a sort of identity card by which the customs officer could establish himself as a man to
be heeded." Id. at 39. The power of entry and search allowed under the 1662 Act of Frauds
was "condition[ed] upon the presence of a constable or other local public officer. The writ of
assistance merely ordered the constable to assist the customs officer in his search-a search
that rested on [the] statutory authority [of the 1662 Act of Frauds]." Mann, supra note 71,
at 356.
The legal snag for Governor Shirley was that the 1662 Act did not authorize governors to
issue writs of assistance. As Smith notes: "The 1662 act expressly laid down that the writ of
assistance should be from the Court of Exchequer, which identity no governor of provincial
Massachusetts conceivably could pretend to." SMITH, supra note 71, at 121.
78. LASSON, supra note 3, at 56; SIrrH, supra note 71, at 122.
79. Professor Lasson makes only a passing reference to this period in his classic study on
the history and development of the Fourth Amendment. See LAssoN, supra note 3, at 55.
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writs of assistance.80 I do submit, however, that these events un-
dermine the broad claim that the colonists were indifferent about
warrantless searches. The controversy over forcible ex officio
searches marked the beginning of a larger concern that eventually
led to the great battle over the writs of assistance.
Telford Taylor argues that colonial litigants were not "at all con-
cerned about warrantless searches incident to arrest."81 It is, how-
ever, a long leap from this narrow proposition to the larger claim
that "the people" who battled British customs officers were uncon-
cerned and untroubled by warrantless searches generally 82 And it
is a hop, skip, and a world record jump to the conclusion that cur-
rent warrantless searches should be measured by a rational basis
model because eighteenth century Americans did not object to
warrantless searches incident to arrest. We do know that some
Massachusetts colonists, subjected to forcible ex officio searches by
British customs officers, did strongly object to such searches, both
in the courts and in the streets.83 It might even be said that in the
minds of the people, an ex officio search and a writ of assistance
search were two different sides of the same coin. Both allowed
80. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court remarked that the 1761
debate over the legality of the writs of assistance
was perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the
colonies to the oppressions of the mother country. "Then and there," said John
Adams, "then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the
arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was
born."
Id. at 625.
81. TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 39.
82. As an intuitive matter, Professor Taylor's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is
troubling. He states: "[O]ur constitutional fathers were not concerned about warrantless
searches, but about overreaching warrants." Id. at 41. In his view, the framers did not envi-
sion "the warrant as a protection against unreasonable searches, [but] saw it as an authority
for unreasonable and oppressive searches " Id. If Professor Taylor's interpretation is
correct, we are forced to conclude that the colonists would have felt better about British
customs officers conducting warrantless, unchecked searches of their homes and businesses
than having those officers' discretion restrained by an order from a judge or magistrate. The
very existence of the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause, however, indicates at least a
concern with, if not distrust of, warrantless searches. Do Professor Taylor and other critics
of the warrant preference rule want us to believe that the colonists who opposed the discre-
tionary powers of British customs officers would not have "vigorously opposed warrantless
searches exhibiting the same characteristics as general warrants and writs and thus impair-
ing privacy and freedom to the same degree?" Kamisar, supra note 33, at 575.
83. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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broad, discretionary governmental search power without any re-
quirement of specific cause or judicial oversight. For the current
Supreme Court and some Fourth Amendment scholars, the dispute
over forcible ex officio searches may appear as only a minor skir-
mish in comparison to the battle fought against the writs of assis-
tance. The objections that impelled the residents of eighteenth
century Massachusetts to fight against forcible ex officio searches,
however, derived from the same principle that launched the attack
on the writs of assistance. That principle-the distrust of discre-
tionary police power-still motivates modern day objections to
warrantless police intrusions.
The second premise of those who criticize the warrant preference
rule is even harder to understand than their acceptance of war-
rantless searches. The critics suggest that judges were the "bad
guys" and warrants were the "weapons" used by judges to oppress
the people. 4 To be sure, some judges played an ignoble part in the
story that is the history of the Fourth Amendment." But the crit-
ics paint a misleading picture when they imply that judges and
magistrates were insensitive to the complaints of colonists ag-
grieved by British search and seizure tactics.
As one scholar of the Writs of Assistance Case has noted,
"judges m colonial America were defying and defeating British
overlordship years before a single soldier took to the field." ' What
motivated these judges "was not spearhead radicalism, but a genu-
84. Professor Taylor writes:
[O]ur constitutional fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches,
but about overreaching warrants. It is perhaps too much to say that they
feared the warrant more than the search, but it is plain enough that the war-
rant was the prime object of their concern. Far from looking at the warrant as
a protection against unreasonable searches, they saw it as an authority for un-
reasonable and oppressive searches, and sought to confine its issuance and exe-
cution in line with the stringent requirements applicable to common-law war-
rants for stolen goods
TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 41.
85. Probably the most well-known judge in the history surrounding the origins of the
Fourth Amendment is Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson of the Massachusetts Superior
Court. Appointed to a court that had been inclined to rule that writs of assistance were
illegal, Hutchinson diligently worked, first to postpone an adverse ruling against the writs,
SMITH, supra note 71, at 388, and then sought the assistance of a customs official in England
in furnishing legal grounds that would convince his judicial colleagues of the legal validity of
the writs. See id. at 388-437.
86. Id. at 5.
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me belief that the general writ did not accord with true legal prin-
ciple. '87 When James Otis, Jr. attacked the legality of the writs of
assistance in the Massachusetts Superior Court, he did not argue
that judges played a minor role in protecting the security of the
people, nor did he claim that all warrants were bad. On the con-
trary, Otis emphasized that the absence of judicial oversight was
one of the prime evils inherent in the writs. The writ of assistance
gave customs officers an open-ended license to invade the homes
and businesses of individuals."8 Writs of assistance, unlike special
warrants under the common law, were not based on sworn infor-
mation presented to a magistrate, nor did they specify the place to
be searched. 9 Furthermore, because the writs lasted for the life of
the reigning monarch, customs officers were not required to return
to court to account for their actions. 90
Although Otis' arguments did not persuade Massachusetts' high-
est court, similar arguments were raised throughout the colonies.91
Ultimately, the colonial judges, articulating many of the same
themes raised by Otis, sided with the people, and sounded the
death knell for the writs. These judges stood as the bulwark
against the efforts of high British officials demanding legalization
of the writs of assistance.9
87. Id.
88. Id. at 342-44.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 343. A writ of assistance, although sometimes characterized as a type of war-
rant, was quite different in scope and authority from the common law warrants issued for
stolen goods. Id. at 37-40. In essence, "[tihe writ was a sort of identity card by which the
customs officer could establish himself as a man to be heeded." Id. at 39.
91. See O.M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40, 43 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939) ("There was popular objec-
tion to [the writs of assistance], not merely in Massachusetts but in practically all the
colonies.").
92. Dickerson wrote:
It took courage for judges to refuse writs of assistance when demanded by the
customs officers, since they held their commissions at the will of the Crown
and were dependent for their salaries upon the revenues collected by the Cus-
toms Commissioners. In the face of such formidable pressure from official
sources it is surprising that the judiciary from Connecticut to Florida, with one
exception, stood firm in opposing the legality of the particular form of writ
demanded of them and continued in their judicial obstinacy through six years
of nearly constant efforts to force them to yield.
Id. at 74.
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For example, in March of 1769, Connecticut Chief Justice
Jonathan Trumbull, while purposefully delaying action on an ap-
plication for a writ of assistance, privately told customs officials
that the "superior court could do nothing contrary to the sense of
the people. '1 3 A short time later, judges of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court expressly refused to issue writs of assistance.94 The
judges "claimed there was no law authorizing them to grant such
general standing writs, but promised to issue particular writs upon
the oath of the customs officer that he had information that pro-
hibited goods were lodged in a particular place."
9 5
During the same period, the Virginia Supreme Court also re-
jected a request for writs of assistance. The actions of Virginia's
high court were significant because Virginia was one of the colonies
"where the issue over writs of assistance was most stubbornly
fought. It was the largest and most populous colony and had more
ports of entry than any other." ' Instead of yielding to an "impres-
sive array of legal opinion from England"9  urging the issuance of
general writs, the Virginia court ordered the colony's attorney gen-
93. Frese, supra note 75, at 259-60. A similar hostility towards the writs prevailed in the
Rhode Island judiciary. Customs officials twice applied for the writs in 1768 and 1769. This
fact notwithstanding,
the [Rhode Island] judges appeared before the general assembly in 1771 and
stated that no application had been made. It is not necessary to assume that
the judges were not telling the truth. Under the procedure of the common law
and [the relevant British statute], they had never received a legal application
for a writ of assistance. That procedure required that the applicant should
state on oath that he had information that uncustomed goods were in a partic-
ular place. The application by the customs officers had not alleged any specific
violation of the law nor named any specific place to be searched. Failing this,
their applications were without legal standing and the judges ignored them.
Dickerson, supra note 91, at 51.
94. Dickerson, supra note 91, at 58-61.
95. Frese, supra note 75, at 264. Dickerson further notes that the actions of the Pennsyl-
vania court, lead by Chief Justice William Allen, in refusing to issue the writs
came after it had been specifically overruled by an opinion of the attorney
general of England. It took courage for a colonial chief justice, himself a Tory,
to persist in his ruling when he had before hun an opinion specifically referring
to him and quoting adversely from his own decision.
Dickerson, supra note 91, at 61.
96. Dickerson, supra note 91, at 72. According to Dickerson, "[w]hat happened in Massa-
chusetts [was] tame compared with the struggle in Virginia." Id. at 73.
97. Id. at 73.
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eral to prepare an application for a writ that was consistent with
the requirements of a specific writ.98
The chief justice of East Florida followed a similar path. When
customs officials requested a writ, Chief Justice William Drayton
denied their request, writing:
In Answer to your Application to me for Writs of Assistance to
be lodged in the Hands of the Custom House Officers m this
Province to search for & to seize prohibited or uncustomed
Goods with the same, I must inform you: That I am, & always
shall be ready to issue such Writs to search all Places, which by
Oath made before me shall be suspected to know to contain
Goods of that Kind. But I do not think myself justified by Law
to issue General Writs for that Purpose, to be lodged in the
Hands, & to be executed discretionaly, (perhaps without any
Foundation) at the Will of subordinate Officers, to the Injury of
the Rights of His Majesty's other loyal Subjects."
These actions by judges in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
and East Florida are a few examples of the "unsung record of cour-
age and fidelity to what they believed to be the law of the land[,]"
and "must be considered in any appraisal of the colonial judici-
ary['s]" willingness to protect against expansive and discretionary
governmental search powers. 100 In the end,
[f]rom the time of the opposition of Otis in 1761 to the last peti-
tion of the customs officials in 1773, the colonial courts had been
remarkably united in resisting the demands for a general search
warrant. Not even the attorney general in England nor the colo-
nial secretary could force their hand."'
The only courts to comply with British requests to issue writs of
assistance were Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South
Carolina.10
2
98. Frese, supra note 75, at 269.
99. Id. at 290.
100. Dickerson, supra note 91, at 74.
101. Frese, supra note 75, at 292.
102. Id. Frese notes:
New York had issued a writ which for some unknown reason proved unsatis-
factory. Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Georgia, and East
Florida had all refused applications; and [there are] only notices of failures in
Newfoundland, St. John's, Nova Scotia, and New Jersey. Quebec, North Caro-
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1993] CENTRAL MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 227
Considering the history surrounding the writs of assistance, it is
difficult to conclude that most colonial judges were insensitive to
civil liberties, or anxious to expand the search powers of govern-
mental officials. Rather, this evidence indicates that many judges,
along with other colonists 10 3 and colonial juris,'" strongly opposed
practices that granted custom officers the discretion to invade the
privacy and personal security of individuals. Yes, the colonists
lina, West Florida, Bermuda, and the Bahamas, were unheard from. It was a
high percentage of failure.
Id. at 292-93.
103. James Otis, Jr.'s place in history as a hero in the fight against governmental search
and seizure power seems quite secure, undoubtedly assisted by John Adams' memory:
I do say in the most solemn manner, that Mr. Otis's oration against the Writs
of Assistance breathed into this nation the breath of life. [Otis] was a
flame of fire! Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I
did, ready to take arms against Writs of Assistance. Then and there was the
first scene of the first Act Opposition to the arbitrary Claims of Great Britain.
Then and there the child Independence was born. In 15 years, namely in 1776,
he grew to manhood, and declared himself free.
10 CHARLES F. ADAMs, THE LIFE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 247-48, 276 (1880).
Similarly, Patrick Henry was a "vivid and forceful leader" of those who opposed ratifica-
tion of the Constitution without a Bill of Rights. LASSON, supra note 3, at 92. Without such
protection, Henry told his colleagues, federal officers would be free to "go into your cellars
and rooms, and search, ransack, and measure everything you eat, drink, or wear." Id. at 93.
See generally Dirk Hoerder, Boston Leaders and Boston Crowds, 1765-1776, in THE AmEm-
cAN REVOLUTION 233 (Alfred F Young ed., 1976).
104. Professor Amar wants us to examine the Fourth Amendment "with fresh eyes."
Amar, supra note 33, at 1179. He notes that under a warrant preference rule, "[a] warrant
issued by a judge or magistrate-a permanent government official, on the government pay-
roll-has had the effect of taking a later trespass action away from a jury of ordinary Citi-
zens." Id. (emphasis omitted). Because, in Amar's view, "juries [can] be trusted far more
than judges to protect against government overreaching," td., judicial warrants are not the
ideal way to protect Fourth Amendment interests. But cf. Dripps, supra note 6, at 935 &
n.154 (1986) (emphasizing the "executive discretion" inherent in warrants as warrant appli-
cations are rarely denied by judges, occasionally warrants that are issued are not executed,
and that, "[a]ccordingly, it is entirely inappropriate to speak of the warrant as a judicial
rather than an executive creature").
Professor Amar argues that warrantless intrusions should be judged in a different light.
Rather than being seen as presumptively illegal, a jury subsequently should assess its rea-
sonableness. Amar, supra note 33, at 1179. Thus,
[i]f the jury deemed the search "unreasonable," the plain words of the Fourth
Amendment would render the search unlawful. Defendant official could thus
be held strictly liable in damages. [T]he Seventh Amendment, in combi-
nation with the Fourth, would require the federal government to furnish a jury
to any plaintiff-victim who demanded one, and protect that jury's finding of
fact from being overturned by any judge or other government official.
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vented their anger against judges who issued writs of assistance,0 5
and yes, they certainly opposed open-ended warrants.' But those
who opposed the unchecked power of British customs officials un-
doubtedly applauded the actions of many colonial courts in refus-
ing to issue writs of assistance. 0 7 Thus, the critics of the warrant
preference rule seem wide of the mark when they intimate that the
judges were the villains in the history and development of the
Fourth Amendment.
V A REASONABLENESS MODEL IS A "BLANK CHECK" FOR THE
POLICE
What does the above history teach us about the central meaning
of the Fourth Amendment? Concededly, this history does not offer
proof positive that the framers would have supported a vigorous
warrant preference rule. On the other hand, "there is certainly
nothing in it to suggest, let alone require, a narrow or a static view
of the fourth amendment's broad language."'1 8 In addition, the his-
torical record casts considerable doubt on the modern Court's ra-
tional basis model for analyzing Fourth Amendment questions.
Eighteenth century Americans who fought against British customs
officers expected more from constitutional principle than a simple
utterance that judges defer to rational and pragmatic search and
seizure practices. They demanded that discretionary search and
seizure powers be restrained.0 9
105. During the Stamp Act Riots in August of 1765, a mob destroyed the home of Massa-
chusetts Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson. JOSEPH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED
AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS
BAY, BETWEEN 1761-1772, app. I at 416 (1865).
106. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
107. Cf. Frese, supra note 75, at 300 ("The real significance of the battle over the writs of
assistance with the American Commissioners of Customs lies in the almost umversal opposi-
tion of the colonial courts.").
108. Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 401.
109. As Patrick Henry told the Virginia Constitutional Convention:
The officers of Congress may come upon you now, fortified with all the terrors
of paramount federal authority. Excisemen may come in multitudes; for the
limitation of their numbers no man knows. They may, unless the general gov-
ernment be restrained by a bill of rights, or some similar restriction, go into
your cellars and rooms, and search, ransack, and measure everything you eat,
drink, or wear. They ought to be restrained within proper bounds.
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This historical evidence reflects "the people['s]" commitment to
the values embodied in the Fourth Amendment. What were those
values? The Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Clause, like
some of the Constitution's other general provisions, "due process
of law," "freedom of speech," "cruel and unusual punishments,"
and "equal protection of the laws," is one of what Chief Justice
John Marshall called the "great outlines" of the Constitution.11
The framers declared a broad principle about governmental power
m guaranteeing freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.
Under that broad principle, government authority and discretion
would not go unchecked.11 Put in simpler terms relevant to our
current tunes, the broad principle embodied in the Reasonableness
Clause is that discretionary police power implicating Fourth
Amendment interests cannot be trusted. The modern Court, none-
theless, insists that a rational basis model fulfills the central pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment. The law controlling the search of
private containers exemplifies how the Court's current model pro-
motes police power at the expense of Fourth Amendment
freedoms.
LASSON, supra note 3, at 93 (quoting 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITU-
TION 448-49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1988)).
110. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
111. Employing different descriptive terms, many others have recognized the broad prm-
ciple embodied m the Fourth Amendment's cryptic prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting) (The framers "conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment."); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) ("[Clonstitutional provi-
sions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and
literal construction deprives them of half of their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation
of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and agamst any stealthy encroachments
thereon."). LANDNsZi, supra note 33, at 47 ("[The Fourth Amendment embodies a spiri-
tual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it consti-
tutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human
dignity, and that this privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need,
and then only under stringent procedural safeguards."); cf. Amsterdam, supra note 26, at
352, 403 (recognizing the difficulty and complexity of articulating a single, comprehensive
Fourth Amendment theory, but ultimately urging that Fourth Amendment decisionmaking
involves a "value judgment" about how much privacy and security is needed in a free and
open society).
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A. Search and Seizure Doctrine as Applied to Prwate
Containers: The Fourth Amendment as an Odious Right
As an intuitive matter, the Court's approach to police searches
of private possessions is difficult to fathom. Even the most ardent
foe of a broad interpretation of civil liberties is hard pressed to
deny that the Fourth Amendment ranks as a fundamental right
deserving strict judicial protection. Unlike many of the rights rec-
ognized by some of the more controversial civil liberties rulings of
the last few decades, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure is specifically set forth in the Bill of Rights.'12
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is not some
leftover relic of the eighteenth century Most individuals under-
stand the value of privacy, property, and personal security, and the
need to check discretionary police power that intrudes upon these
interests. Consider, for example, the context of a police search of a
private container. For the average layperson, the private nature of
one's purse, briefcase or luggage is self-evident. Opening another's
purse or wallet without permission is rude and offensive. Private
containers are typically not transparent for a reason-individuals
do not wish disclosure of their contents. Briefcases, for instance,
have locks because their owners want to prevent others from ob-
taining access to the contents. People provide identification mark-
ers on luggage and other private containers in order to avoid con-
fusing their possessions with the items of other persons.
If these privacy expectations are accurate and reasonable for the
general public, it follows a fortiori that the Fourth Amendment
strongly addresses police intrusions that jeopardize these same pri-
vacy interests. 13 Because the Fourth Amendment applies to items
such as luggage, purses, and briefcases,11 4 one would expect the
112. Cf. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 246 (1990) ("The Fourth Amendment's
protection of the privacy of the home from unreasonable searches is an illustration" that the
"Constitution does protect defined aspects of an individual's privacy.").
113. Of course, the Fourth Amendment applies only to government actors. The intrusive
actions of private actors are beyond its reach. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475
(1921).
114. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981) (plurality opinion) ("Th[e]
[Fourth] Amendment protects people and their effects, and it protects those effects whether
they are 'personal' or 'impersonal.' "); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977) (hold-
ing that a warrant was necessary to search locked personal luggage secured in the arrestee's
230 [Vol. 35:197
CENTRAL MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Court to be particularly vigilant in its review of police searches of
closed containers.115 If checking police discretion and authority is a
relevant concern of the Fourth Amendment, one might also sus-
pect that the Court would narrow, not expand, the instances in
which the police are free to conduct warrantless searches of private
containers. The Court's rational basis model, however, has followed
a direction that is diametrically opposed to these natural
expectations.
In 1982, the Court considered whether the police should be free
to conduct warrantless searches of private containers found during
the course of a routine automobile search. 116 Instead of looking to
the requirements of the Warrant Clause, the Court relied upon an
ad hoc balancing formula.11 In resolving the balance, the Court
ruled warrantless searches of private containers valid despite the
commands of the Warrant Clause because "[w]hen a legitimate
search is under way, . . nice distinctions between . . glove com-
partments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in
the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt
and efficient completion of the task at hand." ' In other words,
the need for "prompt and efficient" police searches holds a higher
value in the Court's eyes than personal privacy and judicial super-
vision of police intrusions.
Similarly, the Court refused to "second-guess" police depart-
ments that search the private possessions of an arrestee prior to
incarceration, even cases in which the police have no suspicion for
car); cf. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (finding that the Fourth Amend-
ment permits no distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers).
115. As Justice Thurgood Marshall has noted: "One need not carry contraband to prefer
that the police not examine one's private possessions. Indeed, that preference is the premise
of the Fourth Amendment." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 393 (1976) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
116. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
117. Id. at 825. Ross considered "the extent to which police officers-who have legiti-
mately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to believe that contraband is
concealed somewhere within it-may conduct a probing search of compartments and con-
tainers within the vehicle whose contents are not in plain view." Id. at 800. Importantly, no
exigency existed to justify an immediate search under the facts in Ross. See td. at 830-32
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court concluded that although an individual has a legitimate
privacy interest in the contents of a private container, that interest must yield to the gov-
ernment's interest in conducting the search. Id. at 822-23.
118. Id. at 821 (footnote omitted).
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a search and less intrusive methods are available to serve the
state's interests.119 Citing the advantages of unsupervised police in-
trusions, the Court emphasized that "every consideration of or-
derly police administration benefiting both police and the public
points toward the appropriateness" of allowing suspicionless
searches. 120 The Fourth Amendment interests of the individual
were given short shrift.
Despite the Court's crabbed interpretation, a person who has
been arrested and who will soon be incarcerated should be pro-
tected against the exercise of unnecessary police power.12' As Pro-
fessor Weinreb has noted:
The "search" of possessions that a person carries with him can
be a means for imposing one's will on him and making it clear to
him that he is not in control. The contents of a wallet can be
spread out on a table, handled, commented on ("Who's this
babe?" "Whatcha got his picture for ?"), and sullied. Items that
119. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 642-43 (1983). The question in Lafayette was
whether, "at the time an arrested person arrives at a police station, the police may, without
obtaining a warrant, search a shoulder bag carried by that person." Id. at 641. The Court
ruled that such a search was permissible. Id. at 648.
120. Id. at 645-46. The Court listed the following interests that justify inventory searches
of the private possessions of incarcerated persons: a search protects the arrested person's
possessions against the possibility of theft by government officials; searches deter the asser-
tion of false claims by the arrestee; and searches inhibit the introduction of dangerous and
contraband materials into jail facilities. Id. at 646. According to the Court, "[iut is immate-
rial whether the police actually fear any particular package or container; the need to protect
against such risks arises independent of a particular officer's subjective concerns." Id.
121. Some of the Justices are evidently prepared to find that the Fourth Amendment
offers slight, if any, protection concerning the privacy of arrestees. See, e.g., Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 538 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring ) ("The fact of arrest and incar-
ceration abates all legitimate Fourth Amendment privacy and possessory interests in per-
sonal effects, and therefore all searches and seizures of the contents of an inmate's cell are
reasonable.") (citations omitted); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (holding that
strip searches and visual body cavity searches of pretrial detainees after every contact visit
with a person from outside the institution do not violate the Fourth Amendment); United
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1974) (holding that a lawful arrest permits the
police "for at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extent-[to] take [the arrestee's]
privacy out of the realm of protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and
evidence") (quoting United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 493 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1037 (1970)); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1973) (Powell, J., con-
curring) ("If the arrest is lawful, the privacy interest guarded by the Fourth Amendment is
subordinated to a legitimate and overriding governmental concern.").
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are intimate not intrinsically but because of long, familiar asso-
ciation can be exposed.
122
A majority of the Court, however, is unwilling or incapable of
recognizing the legitimate privacy interests that all human beings
possess. Even more troubling, the Court ignores these interests
even in cases lacking an overriding need for a police intrusion.1 3
Indeed, when confronted with the fact that the state's interests are
adequately served without permitting suspicionless inventory
searches, the Court responds that its rational basis analysis does
not require strict judicial oversight of administrative police proce-
dures that invade the private possessions of arrestees. 124
More recent evidence of the Court's disinterest in Fourth
Amendment freedoms is abundant. Should the police be free to
conduct suspicionless searches of private containers found inside
impounded and inventoried cars? 125 Certainly a motorist's alleged
violation of the traffic laws does not diminish or waive her privacy
interests in the contents of her purse or suitcase.
Violation of a traffic law does not justify an officer's search of a
motorist's purse or briefcase, even though the officer may be forced
to remain in close proximity to the motorist during questioning
122. Wemreb, supra note 31, at 78.
123. Id. ("Nothing about an arrest makes [a police inventory search of private posses-
sions] incidental or reasonable; the need to inventory personal property or maintain
security in cells requires only that the property be placed in a locker by the person
himself.").
124. In Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), the Court conceded, as it had to, that
the police had no grounds for a search, id. at 643, and that less intrusive means may have
been available to promote the state's interests. Id. at 648. Nevertheless, the Court explained:
[T]he real question is not what "could have been achieved," but whether the
Fourth Amendment requires such steps[.]. The reasonableness of any par-
ticular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the ex-
istence of alternative "less intrusive" means. We are hardly in a position
to second-guess police departments as to what practical administrative method
will best deter theft by and false claims against its employees and preserve the
security of the station house. It is evident that a station-house search of every
item carried on or by a person who has lawfully been taken into custody by the
police will amply serve the important and legitimate governmental interests
involved.
Id. at 647-48 (citations omitted).
125. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (holding that opening a closed
backpack pursuant to a suspicionless inventory search does not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
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about the infraction and presentation of the traffic ticket. The
Court has held that the interior of an automobile should receive
less protection than the interior of one's home. 2 It does not follow
from this proposition, however, that the lesser expectation of pri-
vacy accorded an automobile's interior automatically extends to a
sealed handbag, locked briefcase, or zippered backpack. There is a
big difference between spreading a group of photographs on the
backseat of a car, and placing those same photographs in a closed
suitcase that happens to sit on the same backseat. The Court, how-
ever, has concluded that suspicionless searches of private contain-
ers during a routine inventory are reasonable. 127
The Court offers several reasons supporting a suspicionless
search of private containers found during a police inventory First,
a police inventory of an automobile's contents, including private
containers located therein, is unrelated to the investigation of
criminal conduct. 128 In addition, allowing the search enables the
state to protect "an owner's property while it is in the custody of
the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized
property, and to guard the police from danger. " 29 These state in-
terests, in the Court's eyes, "outweigh[] the individual's Fourth
Amendment" rights. 30
Are these reasons convincing, or is the Court simply assuming
that the public will tolerate a crabbed view of private possessions
in order to book a few criminals9 Certainly the Court's initial justi-
fication for ignoring the commands of the Warrant Clause-that
an inventory search is not a criminal investigation-will not suffice.
126. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-94 (1985); United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1924).
127. In Bertine, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment did not bar the police from
conducting a suspicionless search of a closed backpack found during the inventory of a vehi-
cle that was about to be taken to an impoundment lot. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 369.
128. Id. at 371 (determining that inventory searches are an exception to the warrant re-
quirement and that the policies underlying the warrant requirement and the concept of
probable cause are not implicated by inventory searches); see also South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1976) ("The standard of probable cause is peculiarly related to
criminal investigations, not routine, non-criminal procedures. The probable-cause approach
is unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative care-
taking functions, particularly when no claim is made that the protective procedures are a
subterfuge for criminal investigations.").
129. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372.
130. Id.
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It is too late in the day to argue that the Fourth Amendment only
protects the private possessions of criminals. s13  Such statements
will encourage the notion that the Fourth Amendment "has be-
come constitutional law for the guilty.
13 2
The Court's other, equally unpersuasive, reason for disregarding
the dictates of the Warrant Clause is the state's interest in protect-
ing a motorist's property and police departments from false claims
and dangerous contraband."3 3 Nor should the police have carte
blanche authority because inventory searches are deemed "rou-
131. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
132. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1677 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
The anomalous nature of the Court's Fourth Amendment theory is reflected in the greater
constitutional protection accorded private possessions when the police suspect the existence
of criminal conduct than when such suspicion is absent. Under current law, if the police
arrest Joe Guilty as he exits a taxi cab or walks down the street, they may not immediately
search a suitcase that he is carrying even though they have probable cause to believe that
contraband may be inside. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). On the
other hand, if Charley Innocent forgets to feed the parking meter and his car is towed to an
impoundment lot, the police are free to search any and all private possessions found inside
the car, even in the absence of any reason to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime
is likely to be discovered. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367 (1987).
133. As noted, the Court in both Opperman and Bertine justified inventory searches on
the grounds that such searches serve three state interests: (1) "the protection of the [vehi-
cle] owner's property while it remains in police custody;" (2) "the protection of the police
against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property;" and (3) "the protection of the police
from potential danger." Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369; see also Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372.
The first state interest is adequately addressed by "the use of secure impoundment facili-
ties." Bertine, 479 U.S. at 382 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Further, even when provision of
such facilities may not be practical for a police department to provide, administrative con-
venience is an insufficient reason to permit routine searches of an individual's private pos-
sessions, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment's vital role in the Bill of Rights.
Similarly, inventory searches will not completely guarantee the second state inter-
est-protection against false claims--"smce there remains the possibility of accompanying
such claims with an assertion that an item was stolen prior to the inventory or was mten-
tionally omitted from the police records." Opperman, 428 U.S. at 379 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
Finally, the third state interest-protection from potential danger-is unpersuasive be-
cause "there is little danger associated with impounding unsearched automobiles." Id. at
378 (Powell, J., concurring). Indeed, as Justice Marshall has noted, this interest is plainly
unconvincing: "Not only is protecting the police from dangerous instrumentalities an atten-
uated justification for most automobile inventory searches, but opening closed containers to
inventory the contents can only increase the risk." Bertine, 479 U.S. at 384 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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tine" police work.134 Doubtlessly from an officer's perspective,
searching thousands of handbags, wallets, and backpacks is a "rou-
tine" and mundane matter. From the perspective of the individual,
however, the so-called "routine" search of a wallet or purse invades
privacy no less than a deliberately planned search. Moreover, even
though governmental intrusions seem to occur more frequently in
our increasingly urban society, hopefully society does not yet con-
done as routine police searches of our handbags, wallets, and other
private possessions.135
If the Court's justifications seem pretextual or halfhearted, an-
other explanation for the Court's actions may exist. The Court is
uninterested in placing the Fourth Amendment in the category of
preferred constitutional rights, including the rights of free speech,
freedom of religion, and freedom from racial discrimination, de-
spite its specific placement in the Bill of Rights. When the Court
considers whether government action violates those rights, it usu-
ally employs strict judicial scrutiny 136 In other words, the Court
determines whether compelling state interests justify invasion of a
134. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1976).
135. Cf. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Pn-
vacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 738-39 (1993) (in an empircal
study on the degree of intrusiveness associated with different police investigative methods,
searches of luggage found in cars received a relatively high rating of intrusiveness). Even
those who empathize with the complaints often raised by the police have indicated a
marked discomfort with the reasons proffered by the Court for allowing inventory searches.
See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 379-80 (Powell, J., concurring); cf. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 7.4(a), at 101-16 (1987) (criticizing the reasoning of Opperman).
136. See, e.g., R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547-48 (1992) (holding that
strict scrutiny applied to a city ordinance which prohibited the display of a symbol known
to arouse anger in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender, and which
allegedly violated the freedom of speech); Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1851 (1992)
(holding that a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum must serve a
compelling state interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve that interest); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1991)
(applying strict scrutiny to a state law which allegedly violated the First Amendment's pro-
tection of free speech); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
("[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that
the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool."); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2243-44 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that
the Court has applied strict scrutiny in its review of laws burdening religious practice on
numerous occasions).
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constitutional right, and whether the means chosen by the govern-
ment are narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.
Fourth Amendment claims, however, do not receive similar judi-
cial review. Thus, m the automobile inventory search case, when
confronted with the reality that less intrusive means were readily
available as a substitute for a suspicionless search, the Court re-
sponded that "'[t]he real question is not what "could have been
achieved," but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such
steps. The reasonableness of any particular governmental ac-
tivity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of
alternative "less intrusive" means.' ,,137
This sort of reasoning seldom is tolerated when the Court de-
cides claims concerning preferred constitutional rights. For exam-
ple, when needlessly broad legislative measures implicate the pre-
ferred rights of freedom from racial discrimination or freedom of
speech, the Court normally will declare the state's action invalid.1 3 8
Likewise, when other fundamental rights are at stake, the Court
generally is unwilling to defer to government claims of necessity 139
Why are Fourth Amendment claims treated differently 140 One an-
137. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)).
138. See, e.g., R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549 (noting that the "'danger of censorship'
presented by a facially content-based statute requires that [a content-based law]. be
employed only where it is 'necessary to serve the asserted [compelling] interest' ") (quoting
Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1852 (1992); Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1444
(1991)); Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512 (acknowledging the state's compelling interest,
but concluding that the law "is not narrowly tailored to advance [the state's] objective
[and therefore] is inconsistent with the First Amendment"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 500
("[Wihen a legislative body chooses to employ a suspect classification, it cannot rest upon a
generalized assertion as to the classification's relevance to its goals.").
139. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 501 ("The history of racial classification in this country sug-
gests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity
has no place in equal protection analysis."); see also Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2233 ("A law that
targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental in-
terests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in
rare cases.").
140. A skeptic might observe that unlike the other constitutional rights noted above, the
text of the Fourth Amendment, with its emphasis on reasonableness, invites the balancing
test that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have employed. While this is a fair point, as I
have argued, no proof has been offered that the framers intended such a literalist mterpre-
tation of the provision. Furthermore, this view diminishes the Warrant Clause, and leaves
the Court with no guiding principle to structure search and seizure law. See New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 370 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[T]he presence of the word 'unreasonable' in the text of the Fourth Amendment does not
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swer may be that minimum judicial review is condoned in search
and seizure cases because the Court has "relegated [the Fourth
Amendment] to a deferred position. '1 4'
Why is the Fourth Amendment considered a second-class
right?142 My guess is that the Court sees the typical Fourth
Amendment claimant as a second-class citizen, and sees the typical
police officer as being overwhelmed with the responsibilities and
duties of maintaining law and order in our crime-prone society 43
This dual perception may explain the Court's reluctance to subject
police conduct to vigorous judicial oversight.
Rather than require that government officials meet the same
heightened constitutional standard as in the context of other pre-
ferred rights, the Court employs a rational basis test offering only
minimal judicial oversight. Under this test, warrantless searches
are approved when they serve government interests of administra-
tive convenience and efficiency To be sure, concerns about police
grant a shifting majority of this Court the authority to answer all Fourth Amendment ques-
tions by consulting its momentary vision of the social good."). Finally, even assuming that
the Fourth Amendment envisions a balance between the interests of law enforcement and
the interests of individual privacy and personal security, one still must explain why the
modem Court almost always finds that the interests of the individual are subordinate to the
government's interest of administrative convenience and efficiency.
141. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). In an
article written in the early 1980's, Professor LaFave described the modem Court's treatment
of the Fourth Amendment in less charitable terms: "[I]t is almost as if a majority of the
Court was hellbent to seize any available opportunity to define more expansively the consti-
tutional authority of law enforcement officials." Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Va-
garies (of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing
Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1222 (1983). Professor LaFave's characteriza-
tion remains accurate ten years later.
142. Cf. Dripps, supra note 6, at 936. Professor Dripps analyzes the Court's unwillingness
to apply the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Leon held that
the exclusionary rule requiring the suppression of evidence is not to be applied where police
officials act in reliance on a search warrant that was subsequently declared to be constitu-
tionally invalid. Dripps argues the holding in Leon reflects the value of the Fourth Amend-
ment in the eyes of the Court: "[T]he refusal to apply [the exclusionary rule sanction] or
anything else expresses the judgment that the underlying norm is of little importance. Leon
teaches that Fourth Amendment violations do not matter." Dripps, supra note 6, at 936
(footnote omitted).
143. Professor Alschuler addresses this latter point: "A rule of reason [for deciding
Fourth Amendment issues] that takes an officer's unhappy lot as its starting point may be
fairer, not only from the perspective of the sound administration of public justice, but also
from the perspective of the officer himself." Albert Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the
Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. Ra.v. 227, 234 (1984) (footnote omitted).
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"prompt[ness] and efficien[cy] ' ' 144 are rational state interests, but
these interests are rarely characterized as "compelling" or even
"important" when official action threatens other fundamental
rights.145 Likewise, the Court accepts suspicionless searches even
when other less intrusive means are available both to serve police
interests and to promote Fourth Amendment protections. Under
the rational basis test, warrantless searches will be upheld if the
Court concludes that they promote legitimate state interests or are
administratively convenient. The Court does not employ this type
of reasoning when civil liberties outside of the Fourth Amendment
context are implicated by state action.14
B. Fourth Amendment Theory in the Future: Will It Be Based
on a Recognition of Its Placement in the Bill of Rights?
Despite the above objections, the Court's commitment to a ra-
tional basis model appears quite solid. In the future, some Justices
undoubtedly will seek to expand this model even further to reverse
Fourth Amendment claims which the modern Court previously has
recognized. Consider, for instance, Justice Scalia's recent com-
plaints in Californma v. Acevedo147 regarding the anomalies of the
Court's rules regarding searches of private containers.
The Court in Acevedo held that the police were not required to
obtain a warrant to open a closed container found during the
search of an automobile because they had probable cause to be-
lieve that the object of their search was in the container. 4 While
agreeing with this result, Justice Scalia criticized the Court for not
going further in allowing the police to search any closed container
seized outside of a privately owned building as long as probable
144. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821 (1982).
145. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (noting precedents that rejected
"administrative ease and convenience as sufficiently important objectives to justify gender-
based classifications").
146. See id., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636-38 (1969) (rejecting the argument
that a one year waiting period serves as an administratively efficient guideline for determin-
ing eligibility for welfare assistance and holding that such a requirement is not a compelling
state interest that justifies infringement upon the fundamental right to travel from state to
state).
147. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
148. Id. at 1991.
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cause existed. 149 Currently, if the police seize a container on the
street, such as a suitcase or a footlocker, they may not search it
without judicial authorization unless exigent circumstances call for
an immediate search. 150 If the police seize that same container in-
side an automobile, however, Acevedo allows a warrantless search.
Under Justice Scalia's vision of the Fourth Amendment, the po-
lice would be allowed to seize and search any closed container
when they have probable cause for their actions. Justice Scalia
thought it absurd for the Court to permit the police to arrest a
suspect found on the street, search the arrestee's person and the
area within his grasp, and then inventory the contents of his pos-
sessions at the station house, all without prior judicial authoriza-
tion, but not allow the police to "take the less intrusive step of
stopping [an] individual on the street and demanding to see
the contents of his briefcase."' 5' According to Justice Scalia, a rule
of reasonableness would permit the latter search. 15 2
What makes the search of an individual's briefcase "reasonable"
simply because the police have probable cause to suspect its con-
tents? The Court's precedents do not support Justice Scalia's posi-
tion. 53 Of course, if the police are not allowed to search a
149. Id. at 1992-94 (Scalia, J., concurring). Sixteen years ago the Solicitor General
presented a very similar argument to the Court in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977). See id. at 6-7. The Court rejected the government's position. See id. at 7-11 (stating
that private possessions carried by an individual in public are protected by the Warrant
Clause).
150. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15 & n.9. Cf. Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541 (1990) (per curiam)
(rejecting the argument that a warrantless search of a package that provides probable cause
for an arrest can nonetheless be justified as an incident search of that same arrest).
151. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1993-94 (Scalia, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 1994.
153. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (holding that a private container seized from an individual
may not be searched without a warrant). Also relevant are United States v. Van Leeuwen,
397 U.S. 249 (1970) and Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878), which stated, in dictum, that
letters and packages placed in the mail may not be searched without complying with the
safeguards of the Warrant Clause. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 251; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S.
at 733; see United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) ("Letters and other sealed
packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate
expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects are presumptively unreasona-
ble.") (footnote omitted). Justice Scalia has not explained why the Fourth Amendment for-
bids the warrantless search of a package placed in the mail, but should permit a warrantless
search of that same package if carried on the street.
The heart of Justice Scalia's position rests on the following logic: We allow the police to
effectuate warrantless arrests. An arrest and the intrusions incident to that arrest are signif-
1993] CENTRAL MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 241
container or purse they suspect, they may choose to arrest the in-
icantly more intrusive than a search of a briefcase. In light of the permitted greater intru-
sion, it is irrational not to allow the lesser intrusion associated with a warrantless search.
See Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1992-94 (Scalia, J., concurring).
One problem with this "greater includes the lesser" reasoning is the lack of connection
between the sanctioning of warrantless arrests and the approval of warrantless searches. A
warrantless arrest, although probably more intrusive on personal security than a warrantless
search, see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 425-33 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); 2
LAFAvE, supra note 135, § 5.1(b), at 400 (stating that it "cannot be readily assumed that
personal rights are less deserving of protection than property rights"), is considered consti-
tutional because of its historical acceptance. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 418-22. Although
LaFave correctly describes the Court's opinion in Watson as "remarkable for its lack of
analysis" in concluding that a routine warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, 2 LAFAvE, supra note 135, § 5.1(b), at 399, the historical acceptance of war-
rantless arrests does not provide a determinative reason for allowing warrantless searches.
Beyond the historical grounds supporting warrantless arrests, the exigency concerns asso-
ciated with fleeing felons and the impracticality of obtaining a magistrate's warrant author-
izing the arrest in such circumstances provide the only principled justification for allowing
warrantless arrests. See id. at 400-03.
No similar justification supports warrantless searches of private containers. Once the po-
lice have seized a briefcase or purse, the item cannot possibly flee the jurisdiction before the
issuance of a magistrate's warrant. Moreover, although a seizure negates an owner's posses-
sory interest in the container, that owner still retains a privacy expectation in the contents
of the container. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747-51 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Another problem with the "greater includes the lesser" rationale extends beyond the con-
text of private containers and implicates larger considerations of Fourth Amendment the-
ory. If this reasoning were applied in a serious manner, the entire structure of Fourth
Amendment law would be called into question.
For example, the average person unversed in the intricacies of the Court's Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine might find that an arrest is a greater intrusion than a warrantless search of a
home. When considering the time and indignities associated with an arrest-seizure by the
police, a full-scale search of one's body and possessions, being transported to the local jail
for booking and administrative processing, receiving an arrest record, the likelihood of cus-
todial interrogation, and the possibility of being held for almost two days without the
chance to have a neutral official consider whether the arrest was valid--many individuals
might prefer a search of their home to the trauma and humiliation of an arrest.
The problem with this rationale is that the parade takes over the town. Under a "greater
includes the lesser" theory, one might argue that a warrantless search of a home, or a war-
rantless entry of a home to obtain an arrest, is constitutional because it constitutes a lesser
interference when compared to the greater indignity associated with a public arrest, which
can be effectuated without a warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 617 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting) (arguing that a warrantless "front-door" arrest of a suspect at his
home "is no more intrusive on personal privacy" than the public warrantless arrests upheld
in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 776
(1969) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that it was illogical to argue that the Fourth Amend-
ment forbids a warrantless search of a home where "the invasion and disruption of a man's
life and privacy which stem from his arrest are ordinarily far greater than the relatively
minor intrusions attending a search of his premises").
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dividual. Presumably the police have probable cause that the indi-
vidual is in possession of contraband or other criminal evidence.
This fact can and should be explained to the individual on the
street. If that individual chooses to undergo an arrest in exchange
for the chance to have a judge consider the need for the search, as
well as the justification for the arrest, that choice should be his.'"
The police should not be given the authority to conduct a search
eliminating that choice.
Justice Scalia, however, believes that searching the personal pos-
sessions of a suspect is reasonable, and thus constitutional, because
it is "less intrusive" than what the police might have done under
the circumstances. 11 5 This position is akin to arguing that the
"greater power includes the lesser power. ' 15 6 The belief that the
greater power automatically justifies use of the lesser power is a
troublesome position when considering essentially unchecked po-
lice intrusions.
I do not doubt the logic of Justice Scalia's view After all, if the
police can arrest an individual, search his person and possessions,
and detain the individual for up to two days before a neutral offi-
cial evaluates the strength of the state's evidence, prohibiting the
lesser intrusion of a warrantless search of a private container does
not seem worth the candle. In the abstract, allowing a search of a
backpack or purse is indeed a lesser invasion than the intrusion
and indignity of an arrest. It does not follow, however, that the
police should be free to conduct warrantless searches of private
containers.
The above analysis omits a realpolitik that the Court and the
public often do not discuss. In the ordinary street arrest, an officer,
before making an arrest, might consider other sanctions and vari-
ables that have little to do with the Fourth Amendment. The of-
This type of logic can work havoc on Fourth Amendment freedoms. Under this theory,
only those searches and seizures that surpass some undefined and unknown degree of intru-
siveness will be subject to the warrant requirement. If such a regime is ever accepted by the
Justices, the Court "would simply have read the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitu-
tion." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 480 (1971) (plurality opinion).
154. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 64 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
155. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1993-94 (Scalia, J., concurring).
156. See generally William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the
Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553 (1992) (exploring a similar line of reasoning).
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ficer who contemplates arresting an individual for loitering in a
park after midnight or disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, has
to consider the possibility that the arrestee might turn out to be
the slovenly dressed son of a prominent citizen, or worse, actually
innocent of the charges.
The officer also knows that because an arrestee is likely to per-
ceive the intrusion as a major infringement on his freedom and
personal security, the arrestee might file a complaint with a police
review board or seek redress from a representative on the city
council or in the mayor's office. The possible adverse consequences
and publicity of a "bad" arrest can act as an independent check to
undertaking the arrest.157 As a general matter, police officers have
a profound distaste for having to explain or justify-particularly to
citizen review panels and the media-why they made a certain ar-
rest, especially when the person arrested has the wherewithal to
bring independent scrutiny upon the actions of the police.1 5s
157. Of course, a few officers have no qualms about arresting innocent persons. Paul
Chevigny wrote about abuse of police authority in New York:
A citizen does not have to be poor or black or even to live in the ghetto to be
summarily arrested in a street dispute with a policeman. Just a little defiance
will suffice.
A rude reply to a policeman, not to speak of a refusal to obey, even
when it is given in response to an unlawful order, or to rudeness on the part of
the police, is an invitation to arrest.
PAUL CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW YORK CITY 96 (1969). See also
JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABovE THE LAW 103 (1993) (A female motorist who
complained about an officer's harassment was arrested for an alleged traffic violation. Ac-
cording to the authors, the motorist had committed "two police cultural crimes: She was a
white driver in a black neighborhood where drugs were sold, and she had challenged the
authority of the officer, a serious transgression in the police cultural statute book, where it is
an offense to talk back to a cop."); Constance L. Hays, Damage Awards in False Arrests,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at B3; Todd S. Purdum, Prosecuting Officers; False-Arrest Case
Shows It Can Take Time and Publicity to Redress Wrongs, N.Y. TIms, Mar. 16, 1989, at
B3 (describing criminal convictions and damage awards in cases involving the wrongful ar-
rest of innocent minority persons by New York City Transit Police officers.).
158. See, e.g., SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 157, at 226; UVILLER, supra note 16, at 13-14;
James C. McKinley Jr., Dinkins Denounces Police Protest As Evidence of Widespread
Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1992, at Al. Phil Caruso, President of the Patrolmen's Benevo-
lent Association of New York City, asserts
that officers regard the review board as a tool that criminals use to harass the
police by making phony claims when they are arrested. "There is nothing more
humiliating or demoralizing to a police officer than in the pressures of making
an arrest, they then have to answer to charges made by the person they
arrested."
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Similar concerns do not constrain the typical search of a
backpack or briefcase. The press and elected officials are not likely
to become upset over a police search of a zippered backpack or
closed purse, for the very same reasons warrantless searches do not
disturb Justice Scalia. In the larger scheme of police-citizen en-
counters, even when the police have erred, this form of police ac-
tivity is not so troublesome. In police jargon, these are low-visibil-
ity affairs. Even though individual privacy has been invaded,
individuals subjected to such searches are not likely to complain
because it is probably not worth the bother. As a result, these
searches are not likely to be brought to the attention of police su-
pervisors, nor are they likely to merit the concern of politicians or
the press. Police officers understand this phenomenon. As a result,
they know they have carte blanche to undertake these searches
just about whenever they please.159
Id.
159. Not all police searches are initiated with an eye toward future prosecution. Often
police undertake searches to discover contraband or to harass suspicious individuals. Such
searches reflect the fact that the average officer "sees his job as ferreting out crime." JEROME
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 220 (2d ed. 1975).
It is part of the policeman's job to locate and confiscate illegal substances.
Thus, even if a search revealing possession of an unlawful weapon or an unlaw-
ful narcotic was conducted not as "incident" to an arrest, the policeman would
have done part of his job simply through the act of retrieval. By failing to
make the putatively "unreasonable" search, the policeman would not only have
failed to gain a conviction, but would also have missed collecting objects or
substances regarded as dangerous. In the policeman's view, only good can come
of a search legally defined as "unreasonable," provided the search jibes with
the normative assumptions of the police organization about reasonableness.
Id.
Of course, occasionally, arbitrary searches locate evidence leading to a prosecution. In
those cases,
cops may insert a little invention to fortify the probabli cause upon which a
fruitful search was predicated. Add a small but deft stroke to the facts-say, a
visible bulge at the waistband of a person carrying a pistol. Just enough to put
some flesh on the hunch that actually induced the officer to give the man a
toss; it might make all the difference.
UVILLER, supra note 16, at 116. See also MIKE ROTHMILLER & IVAN G. GOLDMAN, L.A. SECRET
POLICE: INSIDE THE LAPD ELITE SPY NETWORK 31-34 (1992) (describing how Los Angeles
police officers falsify arrest reports); CHEVIGNY, supra note 157, at 87 ("The effort to convict
a prisoner is likewise to be commended, and shaving the facts a little to bring about that
conviction is less reprehensible than avoiding the arrest altogether.").
The lengths to which some police officers will go to obtain convictions was recently re-
vealed in upstate New York. To date, three high-ranking members of an elite criminal in-
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Moreover, there are other practical reasons why an officer would
not knowingly arrest an individual without probable cause. An ar-
rest and its aftermath is a time-consuming and multi-layered pro-
cess. The officer generally has to justify the arrest to his command-
ing sergeant or lieutenant. The arrestee must be put through the
booking process, which requires making a record of the circum-
stances of the arrest, and normally includes fingerprinting and
photographing the arrestee. The arrestee may be held in police
vestigation unit of the New York State Police have plead guilty to fabricating evidence in
criminal prosecutions. These three officers have also implicated other members of the State
Police. Their admissions "paint[] a picture of almost routine fabrication of evidence in crim-
inal cases." Police Investigation Supervisor Admits Faking Fingerprints, N.Y. TIMEs, July
30, 1993, at B5; see Jon Nordheiner, Trooper's Fall Shakes Both Police and Public, N.Y.
TimEs, Nov. 15, 1992, at 41.
This type of case demonstrates the perspective of many police officers. As one former
officer wrote:
Officers, seeing the crush of everyday crime, believed they were under siege,
that extralegal procedures were necessary to counter all those constitutional
rights guaranteed to the enemy. If the suspect happened to be innocent of this
crime, then he was no doubt guilty of another one anyway, so it was better to
guarantee a conviction when you had the chance.
ROTHMILLER & GOLDMAN, supra, at 33. For the officer, arbitrary searches, wrongful arrests of
innocent persons, perjury and fabricating evidence, are "part of the job." Like it or not, this
is how some police officers view their work. The Court, however, continues to formulate
search and seizure rules out of touch with the reality on the streets and in the trial courts.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993), demonstrates this naivete.
Dickerson stated that if an officer engaged in a lawful frisk for weapons feels an object
whose incriminating nature is immediately apparent, he may remove and seize that object
from an individual's pocket even though the officer believed the seized object was not a
weapon. Id. at 2136-37. Under the facts before the Court, "the officer's own testimony 'belies
any notion that he "immediately"' recognized the lump as crack cocaine." Id. at 2138 (quot-
ing State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992)). Accordingly, the Court ruled
that the search was impermissible.
The upshot of Dickerson is easy to predict. An officer is given substantial incentive to
"search first and ask questions later." When an officer feels a suspicious or unusual item his
first reaction will be to search. If the object turns out to be contraband, he can say that its
incriminating nature was "immediately apparent" upon touch. If the item is not contra-
band, then it can be returned to the suspect. In the end, what the Court has done is author-
ize officers to frisk for contraband, cf., Arguments Before The Court: Criminal Law and
Procedure, 61 U.S.L.W. 3641, 3642 (1993) (reporting Justice Scalia's remark that "what we'll
be authorizing is a Terry stop and search for contraband")-which at one time was imper-
missible under the Fourth Amendment. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968)
(holding that an officer's search of a suspect's pocket for narcotics violated the Fourth
Amendment, stating that "[t]he search was not reasonably limited in scope to the accom-
plishment of the only goal which might conceivably have justified its inception-the protec-
tion of the officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man").
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custody overnight or for a day or two. Eventually, the arrest record
will land on the desk of a district attorney who has to decide
whether to prosecute the case. Finally, the arrestee will be brought
before a judge who will review the case.
A warrantless search, on the other hand, is not a complicated
process. A search can be prompted by curiosity, the desire to has-
sle an individual, or as a device to quickly assert the officer's au-
thority during a street encounter. If the search reveals contraband
or other evidence, probable cause can be easily manufactured. If
the search discloses nothing, the encounter can be quickly termi-
nated and the officer and the individual will go their separate
ways.
In sum, the theory that the greater power automatically justifies
use of the lesser power is incomplete in its analysis. The outside
scrutiny that is present in "greater" intrusions is absent in
"lesser," low-visibility police intrusions. Under the existing system,
unreasonable searches are more likely than unreasonable arrests. It
does not follow that the lesser intrusion also implies reduced con-
stitutional scrutiny If anything, these lesser intrusions should re-
ceive greater attention from the Court because there are fewer re-
straints on the police and the police know it. Regrettably, the
pragmatism urged by Justice Scalia does not take this concern into
account.
I suspect Justice Scalia's views on the search of private contain-
ers rests on no more than his own value judgment that this type of
police behavior is reasonable. 160 Put another way, Justice Scalia
believes there is nothing wrong with warrantless searches outside
the home. This analysis, however, omits the need to check discre-
tionary police power. Justice Scalia seems perfectly willing to trust
the authority and judgment of police officers regarding the search
of private possessions.
Unlike Justice Scalia, I do not trust the police with this power.
Where the police need to act quickly to protect themselves or
others from danger, they must be given the authority to act with-
out prior judicial authorization. But in the typical search of a
160. Cf. George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J.
1297 (1990) (arguing that Justice Scalia's criminal procedure opinions reflect either a literal-
ist or formalist model, or a desire to construct formulaic rules).
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purse or briefcase, no exigency exists to justify warrantless action.
Justice Scalia thinks a search is valid because the police believe
evidence may be found; thus, such a search is not irrational and is
sustainable under the Fourth Amendment. I think the search is
illegitimate because police judgment alone is not sufficient to jus-
tify intrusions upon an individual's Fourth Amendment
interests.161
VI. CONCLUSION
Jacob Landynski once wrote that the Fourth Amendment "as fi-
nally drafted and adopted, had both the virtue of brevity and the
vice of ambiguity "'12 He also commented that "[nlowhere in the
amendment is the term 'unreasonable' defined or the relationship
of the two parts clarified.116 3 Our current Supreme Court has ex-
ploited the amendment's linguistic and historical vacuum to fash-
ion its own analytical model for deciding search and seizure ques-
tions. The Court's rational basis model essentially asks whether
the police have acted irrationally while intruding upon the Fourth
Amendment rights of individuals. The Court's model rarely re-
quires warrants authorizing searches, disfavors vigorous judicial
oversight of police searches, and prefers deference to police proce-
dures as the mode of constitutional decisionmaking.
This Essay has tried to identify some of the analytical and his-
torical gaps inherent in a rational basis model. A literal reading of
the language of the amendment does not dictate this model. Nor
does the model adequately take account of pre-Revolutionary atti-
tudes toward warrantless searches that occurred during the era
preceding the battle over the writs of assistance in the colonies.
Finally, the model subordinates judges and warrants to a second-
ary status in Fourth Amendment analysis. This view is inconsis-
161. Justice Frankfurter put it well:
The progress is too easy from police action unscrutinized by judicial authoriza-
tion to the police state. The founders wrote into the Constitution their convic-
tion that law enforcement does not require the easy but dangerous way of let-
ting the police determine when search is called for without prior authorization
by a magistrate.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
162. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 42.
163. Id.
1993]
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tent with the historical role judges played in pre-independence
America as they resisted British efforts to expand the search and
seizure power of its customs officers by obtaining writs of
assistance.
Most importantly, a rational basis model severely diminishes our
rights under the Fourth Amendment. As the private container
cases demonstrate, a rational basis model does not subject police
searches to vigorous judicial check. In many instances, the police
are free to undertake unsupervised and suspicionless searches,
even when less intrusive means are available to serve the state's
interests. In other contexts, warrantless searches are permitted
when the only justification for such a search is police convenience.
In the end, the Court finds that all of these searches are reasona-
ble because they rationally serve legitimate state interests. This
degree of deference to police searches is at odds with the central
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is distrust of discretion-
ary police power. The Fourth Amendment was not inserted in the
Bill of Rights so that judges could meekly defer to government in-
trusions of privacy; rather, the amendment was designed to control
such intrusions."" The colonists who battled the British did not
trust or defer to the judgments of British customs officials.16 5 They
164. As Professor Joseph Grano wrote:
[W]e premise much of our fourth amendment law on the belief that a neutral
and detached magistrate, not a police officer, should decide whether privacy
must yield to the government's desire to arrest or search. A rigorously
enforced warrant requirement would require that a judicial officer, whenever
practicable, decide whether that discretion should be exercised. It would have
the magistrate, not the police officer, decide whether privacy interests should
yield to law enforcement interests or whether the police should investigate fur-
ther before such individual sacrifice is demanded. [U]nder the fourth
amendment, [judicial] review is more appropriate, and more meaningful, if it
occurs before the event.
Grano, supra note 49, at 510.
165. Daniel Malcolm, a colonial merchant and one of the original parties in the Writs of
Assistance Case of 1761, typified the attitude of those colonists who fought against search
and seizure powers of British customs officials. In one incident, he challenged the authority
of customs officers to search his home:
His colleagues esteemed [Malcolm] of seasoned hard timber, and a man so
wholly unafraid must have been a continuing delight to the heart of James
Otis. It was a man of substance and resolution who determined to resist inva-
sion of his dwelling. Why was it that since neither Malcolm nor Mackay
[a colleague who shared a cellar with Malcolm] had contraband they did not
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wanted the discretionary power of customs officers restrained. 6
Today, objections to warrantless police searches do not stem from
a view that police officers are inherently bad people. Instead, ob-
jections are raised against this form of police authority because
"[p]ower is a heady thing[,J and history shows that the police act-
ing on their own cannot be trusted.' 1 67 This distrust of police
power is the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
gratify the officers [who sought access to their cellar]? Malcolm answered that
the officers declined to name the informer, a formality he thought the law re-
quired; that [a customs official] had used him with great rudeness, and that for
his part he would risk life rather than submit to search unless the law allowed
it!
Wolkins, Daniel Malcolm And Writs of Assistance, Massachusetts Historical Society, Vol.
LVIII at 15, 18.
166. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 709-10 (1948) ("The people of the United
States insisted on writing the Fourth Amendment into the Constitution because sad experi-
ence had taught them that the right to search and seize should not be left to the mere
discretion of the police, but should as a matter of principle be subjected to the requirement
of previous judicial sanction wherever possible."); Dripps, supra, note 6, at 938 ("The Fram-
ers meant not just to establish a government, but to limit its power over individuals. They
viewed official power with an almost paranoid suspicion; and they believed that suspicion
justified by power's inherent nature.") (footnote omitted).
167. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
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